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STRUCTURAL FREE EXERCISE 
Mary Ann Glendon* 
and Raul F. Yanes** 
INTRODUCTION 
For some three decades, beginning in the mid-1950s, the Supreme 
Court lavished so much attention on certain political and civil liberties 
that it has become common to speak of a "rights revolution" as having 
taken place in constitutional law. The American legal landscape has 
been profoundly transformed by the heightened protection the Warren 
and Burger Courts accorded to the rights of women and minorities to 
nondiscriminatory treatment and of criminal defendants to fair proce-
dures; by the remarkable development of privacy law; and by the high 
priority the Court has given to freedom of speech and of the press. 
The major landmarks of the judicial rights revolution - Brown v. 
Board of Education, 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 2 Baker v. Carr, 3 Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 4 New York Times v. Sullivan, 5 - have not only affected 
the way Americans live, but the way we envision the problem of order-
ing our lives together in a large heterogeneous republic. Over the 
same period, however, the Court significantly constricted protection of 
freedom of religion through a narrow interpretation of "free exercise" 
and an expansive view of what kind of governmental activity amounts 
to "establishment" of religion. 6 Whatever the position of religious 
freedom on the Court's "Honor Roll of Superior Rights"7 in those 
years, it was not at or near the top. 
With changes in the composition of the Court, a majority of the 
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
6. In our view, the religion language of the First Amendment is in the service of a single 
fundamental freedom, referred to in that amendment as the "free exercise" of religion. See infra 
notes 308-11 and accompanying text. In this article, therefore, we use the terms free exercise of 
religion, religious liberty, and freedom of religion interchangeably. 
7. The expression is Henry Abraham's. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE 
COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (5th ed. 1988). 
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current members seems disposed to give some reconsideration to the 
Religion Clause8 jurisprudence, a body of law that has been described 
on all sides, and even by Justices themselves, as unprincipled, incoher-
ent, and unworkable. 9 Whether this process of clarification will lead 
to increased protection for the freedom of religion, however, is an open 
question. For, though most of the current Justices separately have ex-
pressed discontent with the state of the law in the church-state area in 
dissents and concurring opinions over the years, the Court as a whole 
seems to be veering toward a posture of reflexive deference to the 
elected branches of government where religion issues are concerned. 10 
In Part I of this article, we analyze the development of case law 
interpreting the religious freedom language of the First Amendment 
from the 1940s to the eve of the rights revolution as a casualty of the 
piecemeal approach to incorporation, compounded by a series of judi-
cial lapses and oversights. Part II deals with the fate of the Religion 
Clause in the era of the rights revolution, when the free exercise and 
establishment provisions were deployed in the service of a constitu-
tional agenda to which they were, in themselves, largely peripheral. 
The current period of doctrinal change is the subject of Part Ill, where 
the implicatibns of the emerging deferential approach for religious 
freedom are ~xplored. In Part IV we argue that a holistic, structural 
approach to the text is necessary if the Court is to develop a workable, 
coherent, church-state jurisprudence for our pluralistic, liberal, demo-
cratic society. If rigid separationism is not to be succeeded by an 
equally mechanical form of deference, the Court must now grapple 
seriously with the formidable interpretive problems that were over-
looked or given short shrift in the past. The task is an urgent one, for 
it concerns nothing less than the cultural foundations of our experi-
ment in ordered liberty. 
8. Since a major purpose of this article is to criticize the interpretive process through which 
the First Amendment came to be understood as embodying two separate values at odds with one 
another, see infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text, we depart from the standard practice of 
referring to that amendment's religion language as containing two clauses. We treat the First 
Amendment as containing a single, coherent Religion Clause whose establishment and free exer-
cise provisions are both in the service of the same fundamental value: religious freedom. 
9. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155 (2d ed. 1988); Michael 
W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court 
Heading?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 187-88 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religio11, 
18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 702 (1986); Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1606, 1609-10 (1987) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; see also Walz v. Tax 
Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (Burger, C.J.); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
10. The Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), strongly 
lends itself to this interpretation. See infra Part III. 
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I. INCORPORATION AND THE FAILURE OF LEGAL IMAGINATION 
The Supreme Court's modern Religion Clause jurisprudence grows 
out of the Court's decision in the 1940s to apply the religion language 
of the First Amendment against the states. Before 1940, the Court 
"had never upheld a claim of free exercise of religion, had never found 
any governmental practice to be an establishment of religion, and had 
never applied the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the 
states." 11 The decisions of the 1940s that gave new legal life to the 
religion language of the Bill of Rights were part of the decades-long 
process that has come to be known as incorporation. As early as 1925 
in Git/ow v. New York, 12 the Supreme Court began to hold that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the states 
to abide by portions of the first eight amendments. But the Court of-
fered no systematic account of this historic constitutional transition 
until 1937 when, in Palko v. Connecticut, 13 Justice Cardozo undertook 
to explain why it had made sense to take a piecemeal approach, rather 
than to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights. 
The teaching of Palko is that the Bill of Rights contains an implied 
hierarchy of constitutional values. According to Cardozo, certain 
rights are so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and " 'so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.' " 14 These especially important "fundamental" rights 
are to be distinguished from various other rights (such as the double 
jeopardy provision involved in Palko) in the absence of which 
"[j]ustice ... would not perish."15 The concept of due process, Car-
dozo explained, required that the former, but not the latter, be made 
binding on the states. Cardozo did not suggest any more sophisticated 
ranking than "in" and "out," nor did he offer an exhaustive catalog of 
the rights that ought to be "in." But he made it plain that freedom of 
speech, thought, and religion were among them. 16 Of these, Cardozo's 
rhetoric implied, speech was the most essential. The freedom of 
thought and speech, he wrote, was the "matrix, the indispensable con-
11. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE xiii (1987). Prior 
to the incorporation period, the Court had considered only three important Religion Clause 
cases: Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding tuition grants for Sioux Indians in 
Catholic schools); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding federal funding of a 
Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) 
(upholding federal prohibition of polygamy even where polygamy was based on religious belief). 
12. 268 U.S. 652 {1925). 
13. 302 U.S. 319 {1937). 
14. 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 {1934)). 
15. 302 U.S. at 326. 
16. 302 U.S. at 324. 
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dition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 17 
The Court's first explicit application of the First Amendment's 
religion language against the states came three years after Palko in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 18 a case involving a citizen's speech rights as 
well as his religious liberty. Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness, had been 
proselytizing in a largely Catholic neighborhood by, among other 
things, playing an anti-Catholic record, when he was arrested and 
charged with a breach of the peace. The Court had no difficulty on 
these facts in deciding that the free exercise of religion was a right so 
fundamental that the First Amendment's religion language must re-
strain the states as well as the federal government. The Court over-
turned Cantwell's conviction, ruling in effect that the state's interest in 
keeping the public peace did not outweigh Cantwell's right to pro-
claim and spread his religious beliefs. There can be little doubt that 
the strength of Cantwell's free exercise claim was augmented by the 
free speech interest with which it was inextricably bound. 19 
The Court continued to develop free exercise jurisprudence in a 
series of decisions following Cantwell. In these early cases, the Court 
implicitly employed a balancing approach, weighing the infringement 
on an individual's interests in being free of state interference against 
the burden that an exemption would place on the state's regulatory 
interests. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 20 for exam-
ple, the free exercise and speech interests of Jehovah's Witnesses 
(whose religion forbade them to worship graven images) prevailed 
over a state law mandating recital of the Pledge of Allegiance in public 
schools. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 21 however, the Court found that a 
state's child protection laws outweighed the free exercise and family 
autonomy interests asserted by a Jehovah's Witness who had been 
convicted of aiding her young ward to violate state law by selling reli-
gious leaflets on the public streets. 
The issue of the applicability of the First Amendment's establish-
ment language to the states did not reach the Court until after it had 
decided several cases under the free exercise provision. In these early 
free exercise cases, the Court had no occasion to consider in any depth 
the connections and interplay between the free exercise and establish-
17. 302 U.S. at 326-27. 
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
19. Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court made the connection expressly, noting that the 
Constitution declares "that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to 
communicate information and opinion be not abridged." 310 U.S. at 307. 
20. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
21. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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ment language of the First Amendment. Having proceeded for several 
years as though free exercise and establishment had no necessary con-
nection with one another, the Court by 1947 was susceptible to the 
argument that the establishment provision represented its own in-
dependent set of values. When the question of the incorporation of the 
establishment provision reached the Court in that year, the stage was 
set for the Justices to adopt a controversial and ahistorical interpreta-
tion of that language. . 
Everson v. Board of Education 22 arose from the challenge by a New 
Jersey taxpayer to the state's practice of permitting parents of private 
school students (including students attending church-run schools) to 
be reimbursed for the costs of transportation on public buses to and 
from school. Today, Everson is chiefly remembered not for its holding 
that the transportation reimbursement program at issue was constitu-
tionally valid, but for its wholehearted espousal of a particular view of 
the essential purpose of the Constitution's religion language. It was a 
view that Justice Frankfurter had advanced in a 1943 dissent, where 
he declined to join the Court's decision that a state may not tax the 
sale by Jehovah's Witnesses of religious literature. Explaining why he 
believed that the free exercise claim should not have been upheld in 
that case, Justice Frankfurter claimed that to exempt the proselytizers 
from taxation offended "the most important of all aspects of religious 
freedom in this country, namely, that of the separation of church and 
state. "23 Though the Court majority had been unwilling on the earlier 
occasion to permit separationism to govern its interpretation of the 
free exercise provision, it made it central to its establishment provision 
approach in Everson. 
In so doing, the Court elevated the separation of church and state 
to the status of a constitutional end in itself. This historic move was as 
unreflective as it was fateful. The various opinion writers in Everson 
seemed unaware of the free exercise implications of their acceptance of 
separation as an independent constitutional value. As a matter of judi-
cial craftsmanship, it is striking in retrospect to observe how little in-
tellectual curiosity the members of the Court demons,trated in the 
challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the 
states, language that had long served to protect the states against the 
federal government. For the historical record is clear that when the 
religion language was first adopted it was designed to restrain the fed-
eral government from interfering with the variety of state-church ar-
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
23. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 140 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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rangements then in place.24 Incorporation of this provision therefore 
required some thought about the purpose of the religious freedom lan-
guage and its relation to the Fourteenth Amendment within a modem 
regulatory state. Akhil Amar, writing in the Yale Law Journal, has 
suggested that it was Justice Black's intense desire to advance the in-
corporation project that inclined him to "gloss over" this especially 
complex problem.25 Whatever the motive, a fateful step was taken 
without offering reasons and justification. Moreover, by setting the 
interpretation of "establishment" on a different course from that of 
"free exercise," the Justices in Everson created an appearance of con-
flict between two provisions that history and text suggest were meant 
to work together in the service of religious liberty.26 
Justice Black, writing for the Court, used language that ideological 
plaintiffs later seized upon to further a program of eliminating virtu-
ally all forms of governmental assistance to religion.27 The establish-
ment provision, he asserted, as though it were apodictic, 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set 
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another .... No tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to 
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a "wall of 
separation between church and state. " 28 
Commentators have since exposed the lack of foundation for Jus-
tice Black's novel theory of the original intent of the establishment 
provision.29 But the introduction of Jefferson's "wall" metaphor into 
24. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
25. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1160 (1991). 
26. For criticism of the tendency to treat the free exercise and establishment provisions in 
isolation from one another, see generally: Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pm. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1980); John H. Mans-
field, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. 
REV. 847, 848 (1984); McConnell, supra note 9, at 195. See infra Part IV for discussion of the 
Framers' intent. 
27. For a discussion of the main groups that initiated, financed, or participated in Establish· 
ment Clause litigation, see NOONAN, supra note 11, at 374-75, and RICHARD E. MORGAN, DJSA· 
BUNG AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME 33-41 (1984). 
28. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citation omitted). 
29. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J, EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELi· 
GIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES ch. 2 (1990); 
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 26 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 933 (1986). See also infra notes 298-306 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional analysis was to have profound consequences. 30 Decades 
later, after attempts to derive principles from the metaphor had 
wrought considerable havoc in church-state law, Justice Rehnquist re-
viewed the historical record, summed up the findings of scholars, and 
commented: 
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken 
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establish-
ment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading 
metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France 
at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights 
were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the 
Danbury Baptist Association [where the expression appeared] was a 
short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were 
passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached observer as a less 
than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment.31 
Jefferson himself, it appears, acknowledged the propriety of a vari-
ety of governmental endorsements of religion at the state level, 
notwithstanding the views he expressed in the letter to the Danbury 
Baptists. 32 As for the rest of the Founders, their opinions regarding 
the proper role of religion in the new constitutional order were diverse. 
Some, like Jefferson, were generally unsympathetic to organized reli-
gion, while others, like John Adams, considered vital religions essen-
tial to the proper functioning of the polity.33 
Justice Black's sketchy "history" in support of his separationist in-
terpretation also included a reference to disestablishment in colonial 
Virginia. 34 Black neglected to mention, however, that church-state ar-
rangements in the original thirteen states were as diverse as the views 
of the Founders, with Virginia representing but one model on a spec-
trum that ranged from disestablishment through official state estab-
lishment, with various cooperative arrangements in between. 35 
Although the historical record resists simplistic characterization, it 
contains no support at all for the view that the establishment language 
commanded a complete separation between government and religion 
30. The first reference to Jefferson's metaphor by the Supreme Court occurred in Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). 
31. Wallace v. Jalfree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
32. Amar, supra note 25, at 1159; Richard F. Duncan, Religious Civil Rights in Public High 
Schools: The Supreme Court Speaks on Equal Access, 24 IND. L. REV. 111, 132-33 (1991). 
33. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 29, at ch. 2; see also NOONAN, supra note 11, at 93-
126. 
34. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947). 
35. NOONAN, supra note 11, at 127-67; Wallace v. Jalfree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 n.4 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); see also SANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 
14-15 (1902). 
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at the national level, not to mention the state level, to which the First 
Amendment did not even apply then. The leading champions of 
separationism as a good in itself were not the Founders, but later com-
mentators whose vision of rights owed more to John Stuart Mill than 
to John Locke. 36 
As for the sweeping dicta in Everson that all government laws or 
expenditures that aid religion in any way are invalid, Justice Black 
himself admitted that it could not be taken literally. State court deci-
sions, he observed, had shown "the difficulty in drawing the line be-
tween tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the 
general public and that which is designed to support institutions which 
teach religion."37 To the dismay of dissenting Justices Jackson, Rut-
ledge, Frankfurter, and Burton, Black's opinion for the majority in 
Everson drew that line so as to permit the bus transportation scheme 
in that case to survive. Black acknowledged the "possibility that some 
of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents 
were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pock-
ets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by 
the State."38 He likened the transportation reimbursement program, 
however, to services like fire and police protection which he deemed 
"indisputably marked off from the religious function" of the institu-
tions they aided. 39 To deprive religious institutions of such services, 
he wrote, 
is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment 
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary. State power iS no more to be used so as to handicap religions than 
it is to favor them.40 
Justices Jackson and Rutledge found it impossible to understand 
why Justice Black did not apply the separationist principles accepted 
in Everson to the facts before the Court. "[T]he undertones of the 
opinion, advoeating complete and uncompromising separation of 
Church from State," Jackson wrote, "seem utterly discordant with its 
conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational mat-
ters."41 Justice Rutledge's dissent insisted that the purpose of the 
First Amendment's religion language was "to create a complete and 
36. Regarding the advance of Millean understandings of rights in America, see MARY ANN 
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE chs. 2-3 (1991). 
37. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14. 
38. 330 U.S. at 17. 
39. 330 U.S. at 18. 
40. 330 U.S. at 18. 
41. 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil au-
thority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or sup-
port for religion."42 Rutledge pointed a judicial finger, for the benefit 
of future plaintiffs, toward the areas that, in his view, were most in 
need of reform: 
[A]part from efforts to inject religious training or exercises and sectarian 
issues into the public schools, the only serious surviving threat to main-
taining that complete and permanent separation of religion and civil 
power which the First Amendment commands is through use of the tax-
ing power to support religion, religious establishments, or establishments 
having a religious foundation whatever their form or special religious 
function. 43 
The Rutledge opinion in Everson affords an instructive glimpse of 
an influential assumption at the heart of much separationist thinking 
about the establishment language: the assumption that religion is or 
ought to be a "wholly private" matter. Rutledge took it as self-evident 
that "[t]he realm of religious training and belief remains, as the 
. Amendment made it, the kingdom of the individual man and his 
God," and that "[i]t should be kept inviolably private."44 This theme 
was to recur frequently in church-state opinions over the years. For 
many Justices, the only constitutionally cognizable religious exper-
iences were those that implicated the solitary individual. A subtheme 
was that religious experience is separable from the rest of human life 
and activity.45 
In sum, Everson committed the Court to a cluster of problematic 
positions. The only disagreement was on how vigorously the Court 
should pursue the separationist program. With little or no support 
from text, history, or tradition, the members of the Everson Court 
braided into the Religion Clause the notions that the establishment 
provision was meant to create a "wall of separation" between religion 
and the government, that it was to be broadly construed to prohibit all 
government aid to religion, and that government was required to be 
strictly neutral as between religion and nonreligion. The Court thus 
lent its prestige and sponsorship to a controversial secularizing pro-
gram without even acknowledging what in hindsight seem like obvious 
and serious interpretive problems: What is a religion? What does it 
mean to "prohibit" religious exercise? Is there one Religion Clause or 
two? Does the establishment language embody a value in tension with 
that of free exercise, or is the ban on establishment of religion to be 
42. 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
43. 330 U.S. at 44. 
44. 330 U.S. at 57-58. 
45. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
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interpreted so as to promote free exercise? Is language that was in-
tended to protect state arrangements regarding religion from federal 
intervention a proper subject for "incorporation" at all? 
Once the Court had given broad scope to the concept of establish-
ment, it was inevitable that a host of "Establishment Clause" problems 
would be precipitated, especially as the size and reach of government 
expanded and the structure of American federalism changed. In the 
1940s, state and local governments were already beginning to lose 
some of their autonomy. They would lose much more as Truman's 
Fair Deal and Johnson's Great Society succeeded Roosevelt's New 
Deal. As the apparatus of the regulatory state penetrated every Amer-
ican town and city, the occasions for government and religion to inter-
sect multiplied. The separationist dogma of Everson seemed to require 
that where government advanced, religion must retreat.46 Schools, es-
pecially, became frequent flash points of conflict as the Court elabo-
rated and applied its notion that all government aid to religion 
constituted establishment. 
The Court, in short, produced its broad view of the establishment 
language at just the historical moment when its application would be-
come increasingly difficult. But in the first establishment case after 
Everson to reach the Court, the majority Justices continued to ignore 
many of the issues presented by the approach to which they had com-
mitted themselves. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 47 the Court began to implement the separationist principles it had 
announced but failed to apply two years before in Everson. McCollum 
involved American ecumenism in its infancy in the form of a coopera-
tive effort among members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and several 
Protestant communities in Champaign, Illinois, to facilitate the provi-
sion of religious education for children who were attending public 
schools. Such efforts across the. country were prompted, no doubt, by 
social changes that had endowed the state's near-monopoly over pri-
mary and secondary education with new and enlarged significance. 
Young children were now spending most of their waking hours during 
the school year in environments structured and supervised by public 
employees. The traditional generic Protestantism of most American 
public schools had never been meant to serve as a substitute for moral 
and religious education. It was, in any event, decreasingly suited to 
the needs of religiously diverse student bodies. Protestants, Catholics, 
46. Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious FNedom, FIRST THINGS (forthcoming 
1992). 
47. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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and Jews thus began to explore strategies for providing religious edu-
cation to public school students. 
In 1940, the groups involved in the McCollum case formed a vol-
untary association called the Champaign, Council on Religious Educa-
tion, and secured permission from the local Board of Education to 
hold weekly classes in their respective religions on the premises of 
public schools. The classes, lasting from thirty to forty-five minutes, 
were taught in three separate groups by Protestant teachers, Catholic 
priests, and a Jewish rabbi. These instructors were paid by the Coun-
cil, but were subject to the approval and supervision of the superinten-
dent of schools. The classes were open to children in grades four to 
nine whose parents signed printed cards requesting that their children 
be permitted to attend. Students who did not take religious instruc-
tion were not released from school, but were required to leave the 
classrooms being used for that purpose and to pursue their studies 
elsewhere in the school building. 48 
For the majority, this was an easy case. Justice Black, again writ-
ing for the Court, used the separationist principles of Everson to strike 
down the program. In a short opinion, he concluded that "[t]his is 
beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-sup-
ported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their 
faith."49 The state in this case transgressed the principle of separation 
by helping "to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of 
the State's compulsory public school machinery."50 
Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion, joined by Justices Jackson, 
Rutledge, and Burton, sounded two additional themes that were to 
play important roles in the Supreme Court's efforts to arrive at solu-
tions to vexing church-state problems - the specter of sectarian strife 
and the need for fair treatment of members of numerically small reli-
gious groups and nonbelievers.51 He alluded, first, to the threat that 
religious divisiveness might pose to the unique mission of America's 
public schools: "Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful 
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic 
people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from entangle-
ment in the strife of sects."52 Then, explaining why the optional char-
acter of the religion classes in McCollum did not save the program, he 
pointed out that children belonging to nonparticipating sects might 
48. 333 U.S. at 207-09. 
49. 333 U.S. at 210. 
50. 333 U.S. at 212. 
51. See infra notes 59-69, 87-88, 160-61, 175, 185-95 and accompanying text. 
52. 333 U.S. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). 
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"have inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the school 
should be the training ground for habits of community, or they will 
have religious instruction in a faith which is not that of their 
parents."53 
Justice Jackson, though concurring, was critical of the majority's 
abstract, broad language, and of the regulatory character of its ruling. 
Cautioning against excessive zeal in applying the separationist inter-
pretation, he observed, "for good or for ill, nearly everything in our 
culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is 
saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, 
Christianity ... and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world's 
peoples."54 Belatedly, he raised concerns about the simple transposi-
tion of antiestablishment principles to the states. The courts, he ad-
vised, should accord citizens and local governments a measure of 
flexibility to deal appropriately with America's diverse conditions: 
To lay down a sweeping constitutional doctrine ... apparently approved 
by the Court, applicable alike to all school boards . . . "to immediately 
adopt and enforce rules ... prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of 
religious education in all public schools," is to decree a ... rigid ... 
standard for countless school boards representing and serving highly lo-
calized groups which not only differ from each other but which them-
selves from time to time change attitudes. 55 
Only the lone dissenter, Justice Reed, had begun to worry about 
the implications of Everson. Reed suggested that the Court, by per-
mitting the wall metaphor to serve as a substitute for a reasoning pro-
cess, was shirking the judicial role. "A rule of law," he warned, 
"should not be drawn from a figure of speech."56 The establishment 
provision, he insisted, did "not bar every friendly gesture between 
church and state. It is not an absolute prohibition against every con-
ceivable situation where the two may work together, any more than 
the other provisions of the First Amendment - free speech, free press 
- are absolutes."57 Reed noted, too, that Frankfurter's evocation of 
sectarian strife was inapposite to the facts of the case at hand, which 
involved grass-roots cooperation among the sects in an attempt to 
solve a common problem. The record suggested, he pointed out, that 
the program had operated in a way opposite to that feared by Frank-
furter: "The testimony of the religious education teachers, the secular 
teachers ... and the many children, mostly from Protestant families, 
53. 333 U.S. at 227-28. 
54. 333 U.S. at 236 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
55. 333 U.S. at 237. 
56. 333 U.S. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
57. 333 U.S. at 255-56 (footnote omitted). 
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who either took or did not take religious education courses, is to the 
effect that religious education classes have fostered tolerance rather 
than intolerance."58 
As we have mentioned, a byproduct of the case-by-case approach 
to incorporation was the development of two largely separate bodies of 
Religion Clause law. In what were characterized as establishment 
cases leading out from Everson and McCollum, the Court employed a 
bright-line separationist test; it continued to develop a balancing ap-
proach, however, in what were denominated "free exercise" cases. 
Once the Court had interpreted the establishment provision so broadly 
as to forbid, in principle, any governmental aid to religion, conflict 
with the mandate to accommodate free exercise was inevitable. With 
the extraconstitutional principle of separationism being treated as the 
dominant value in these early cases, it was further almost inevitable 
that free exercise would be narrowly construed to avoid conflict, for 
"accommodations" of religious belief and action, when viewed 
through separationist lenses, were hard to distinguish from impermis-
sible assistance to religion. 
The tension between the clauses vanished, however, where the 
rights concerned were those of nonbelievers. In such cases separation-
ism and free exercise were mutually reinforcing. Thus, in Torcaso v. 
Watkins, Justice Black had no difficulty gathering unanimity for an 
opinion that ruled unconstitutional the Maryland Constitution's re-
quirement of a declaration of belief in God as a qualification for any 
"office of profit or trust."59 The state, he said, could not "pass laws or 
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers," 
and could not favor religions based on a belief in God. 60 
But when accommodation/or religion was sought, the Court nar-
rowly construed free exercise and subordinated it to the value of 
nonestablishment. It was only by construing the free exercise provi-
sion as mainly protecting individual rights, largely ignoring its associa-
tional and institutional dimensions, that the Court was able to avoid 
the sharpest confrontations between the understanding of establish-
ment advanced in Everson and the basic freedom protected by the 
First Amendment's Religion Clause. But in a school prayer case de-
cided in 1962, Justice Potter Stewart called attention for the first time 
to the fundamental incompatibility of the Court's two lines of religion 
58. 333 U.S. at 243 n.6 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 71 N.E.2d 161, 164 (III. 
1947)). 
59. 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961). 
60. 367 U.S. at 495. 
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cases. Engel v. Vitale 61 was the first challenge to prayer in the public 
schools to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer at issue was 
not the "Lord's Prayer," which had long been customary at the begin-
ning of each day in the nation's schools, but rather a nondenomina-
tional prayer that the New York State Board of Regents 
commissioned for use in the public schools of that large and diverse 
state. The prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depen-
dence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our 
teachers and our Country. "62 
When the Union Free School District No. 9 in New Hyde Park, 
New York, introduced the prayer on the regents' recommendation, the 
parents of several children in that district's schools brought suit, 
claiming that the prayer violated the establishment provision of the 
First Amendment in that it breached "the constitutional wall of sepa-
ration between Church and State."63 The case was a simple one under 
the Court's establishment precedents. Justice Black, again writing for 
the Court, forcefully declared that "it is no part of the business of 
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American 
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by govem-
ment."64 The school district had clearly violated the Constitution's 
establishment ban since the "state prayer program officially estab-
lishe[ d] the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer."65 
What makes Engel interesting, however, is not its result, which 
could have been justified without resort to strict separationism, 66 but 
rather the astonishment that a newcomer to the Court, Potter Stewart, 
expressed at the analytical shortcomings of the majority's interpretive 
approach. The establishment label, it seemed plain to him, was being 
employed to cover up a major free exercise issue: 
I cannot see how an "official religion" is established by letting those who 
want to say a prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the 
wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny 
them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation . 
. . . For we deal here not with the establishment of a state church, 
which would, of course, be constitutionally impermissible, but with 
whether school children who want to begin their day by joining in prayer 
must be prohibited from doing so. 67 
61. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
62. 370 U.S. at 422. 
63. 370 U.S. at 425. 
64. 370 U.S. at 425. 
65. 370 U.S. at 430. 
66. See infra notes 104 and 259 and accompanying text. 
67. 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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The Stewart dissent brought out into the open the problematic na-
ture of any sharp distinction between establishment and free exercise 
cases. With virtually complete state control over primary and secon-
dary education in an epoch when children spend less and less time 
with their parents and more and more time at school, the root-and-
branch elimination of all traces of religion from public education un-
avoidably implicates the free exercise provision. At the same time, it 
mandates a state of affairs that, to many religious Americans, looks 
very much like establishment of a secular religion. This insight did 
not, of course, dictate a decision in favor of state-sponsored school 
prayer. Instead, it revealed the extreme complexity of the task of pro-
tecting religious liberty in a diverse society, a complexity the Court 
had hitherto largely succeeded in disguising from itself and others. 
Justice Stewart was unimpressed with the majority's ritualistic evo-
cation of religious strife of long ago: "What is relevant to the issue 
here is not the history of an established church in sixteenth century 
England or in eighteenth century America, but the history of the reli-
gious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the 
institutions and officials of our government."68 With numerous exam-
ples, ranging from the inaugural addresses of presidents to official slo-
gans and mottoes, he reminded his colleagues of how deeply religious 
meaning and content permeated American history and life. 69 Any at-
tempt to understand the establishment language in a vacuum without 
taking account of this living reality was bound to be wooden and 
simplistic. 
Stewart continued his critique of the Court's establishment doc-
trine along these lines in subsequent dissenting opinions, but his was a 
lonely voice on what was now the Warren Court. Stewart's colleagues 
were satisfied to continue to develop their Religion Clause jurispru-
dence under the aegis of Everson. 
With hindsight, incorporation in the 1940s posed formidable legal-
political challenges that should have called forth every ounce of en-
ergy, wit, technical skill, and legal imagination available to the Court. 
Yet it is hard to escape the impression in reading the decisions of that 
era that - regardless of outcomes - serious issues were overlooked, 
important claims and arguments were rather lightly dismissed, and 
practical implications for the lives of countless Americans were regu-
larly ignored. The Court skipped carelessly over formidable problems 
of interpretation that required sustained attention to the language, his-
68. 370 U.S. at 446. 
69. 370 U.S. at 446-49. 
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tory, and purposes of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the relation among them in the modem 
regulatory state. In lieu of embarking on that demanding process, Ev-
erson gave the Supreme Court's support to an approach to the religion 
language of the First Amendment in which the concept of establish-
ment was broadened, treated as separate from, and actually placed on 
a collision course with the value it was meant to serve - the free 
exercise of religion. 
Once the Court embarked without discussion on that path, it was 
almost impossible for it to avoid construing free exercise narrowly to 
prevent, so far as possible, accommodations of religious belief and ac-
tion that might appear, under a broad concept of establishment, to 
constitute impermissible assistance to religion. The end result was an 
inversion of the First Amendment's religion language. A single coher-
ent provision that on its face seemed to protect freedom of religion by 
forbidding Congress to establish religion or otherwise burden free ex-
ercise70 became two "clauses" with free exercise regularly 
subordinated to a broad notion of nonestablishment. As time went on, 
forbidding governmental support of religion became the cardinal value 
served by the Court's decisions, and the free exercise of religion took a 
back seat. Language that had been placed at the beginning of the Bill 
of Rights to protect religion from government had been turned around 
to protect government from religion. This subjugation of religious 
freedom to separationism continued even as the Warren Court moved 
more broadly to increase the scope of freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights. 
II. THE RELIGION CLAUSE IN THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
Beginning in the mid- to late 1950s, there emerged a consistent 
voting bloc on the Supreme Court willing to develop and expand the 
constitutional protection of a broad range of political and civil rights. 
Over the next three decades, the Court, exercising a vigorous form of 
judicial review in selected areas, announced sweeping new doctrines 
that extended the scope of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the 
rights of the criminally accused, due process protection of certain stat-
utory entitlements, privacy rights, and equal protection. At first, it 
seemed that the rights revolution might yield heightened protection 
for religious freedom. For, in the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, 71 the 
Warren Court substituted a "compelling interest" test for the less rig-
70. I ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 555-56 (1950). 
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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orous balancing approaches that it had been employing in free exercise 
cases since the 1940s. But in School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 72 an establishment case decided on the same day as Sherbert, 
the Court signaled that separationism would continue to drive its ap-
proach to establishment cases, taking priority over other aspects of 
religious freedom. As time went on, it became apparent that the War-
ren Court would not merely follow the separationist principles laid 
down in Everson, but would give them a new antimajoritarian thrust. 
Coalitions of Justices preoccupied with protecting individuals and se-
lected minorities from "majoritarian" legislation regularly conscripted 
the Religion Clause in the service of that agenda. Separationism and 
antimajoritarianism, rather than religious freedom, became central to 
the Warren Court's approach in Religion Clause cases. 
The marriage of these themes was effected in Sherbert and 
Schempp, but not without notice and adverse comment by Justices 
Stewart and Goldberg, relative newcomers to the Court to whom 
many of the premises on which Religion Clause interpretation had 
proceeded seemed shaky. In Sherbert, the new, higher standard of re-
view for free exercise cases was applied to require that unemployment 
benefits be provided to a Seventh Day Adventist who was discharged 
for refusing to work on her Sabbath day.73 To require accommodation 
of religion in that way did not violate the Establishment Clause, Jus-
tice Brennan argued, because it did "not represent that involvement of 
religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Estab-
lishment Clause to forestall."74 Justice Stewart, stating that "no lib-
erty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which 
our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause," concurred.75 But he could not accept Jus-
tice Brennan's characterization of the purpose of the establishment 
provision or the implicit subordination of free exercise. The Court's 
excessively broad interpretation of establishment had led, he pointed 
out, to "a double-barreled dilemma, which in all candor . . . the 
Court's opinion ha[d] not succeeded in papering over."76 Where free 
exercise was concerned, the Court had at times "shown ... a distres-
sing insensitivity to the appropriate demands of this constitutional 
guarantee."77 In the establishment area, the Court's approach had 
72. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
73. 374 U.S. at 406-07. 
74. 374 U.S. at 409 (citation omitted). 
75. 374 U.S. at 413 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
76. 374 U.S. at 413. 
77. 374 U.S. at 414. 
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"on occasion ... been not only insensitive, but positively wooden, and 
... the Court ha[d] accorded to the Establishment Clause a meaning 
which neither the words, the history, nor the intention of the authors 
of that specific constitutional provision even remotely suggests."78 
Focusing on the problem that the Everson and McCollum courts 
had studiously ignored, Justice Stewart pointed out that the strict sep-
arationist approach inaugurated in those cases had created many "sit-
uations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will 
run into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive and sterile con-
struction of the Establishment Clause."79 If the Court took its own 
construction of the establishment language seriously ("the Establish-
ment Clause bespeaks 'a government ... stripped of all power ... to 
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions' "80), it would have 
had to conclude in Sherbert that South Carolina was constitutionally 
compelled to refuse the Seventh Day Adventist unemployment 
benefits. 
To Justice Stewart it seemed plain that the source of the difficulty 
was a "mechanistic" concept of the establishment provision that he 
labeled as historically and constitutionally wrong. 81 His concurring 
opinion in Sherbert was an indictment of the slapdash manner in 
which the Court had approached the problems of incorporation in the 
1940s, and a reminder that the core guarantee of the Religion Clause, 
religious liberty, should not be applied or withheld depending on ma-
jority or minority status. 
I think the process of constitutional decision in the area of the relation-
ships between government and religion demands considerably more than 
the invocation of broadbrushed rhetoric . . . . And I think that the 
guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exercise Clause af-
firmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospitality 
and accommodation to individual belief and disbelief. In short, I think 
our Constitution commands the positive protection by government of 
religious freedom - not only for a minority, however small - not only 
for the majority, however large - but for each of us. 82 
Acknowledging that the flawed "decisions are on the books," Stewart 
nevertheless insisted that stare decisis did not absolve the Court from 
its "duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict" these deci-
sions had created. 83 
78. 374 U.S. at 414. 
79. 374 U.S. at 414. 
80. 374 U.S. at 398 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947)). 
81. 374 U.S. at 415. 
82. 374 U.S. at 415-16. 
83. 374 U.S. at 414, 416. 
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It is a duty . . . which we owe to the people, the States, and the 
Nation, and a duty which we owe to ourselves. For so long as the re-
sounding but fallacious fundamentalist rhetoric of some of our Establish-
ment Clause opinions remains on our books, to be disregarded at will ... 
or to be undiscriminatingly invoked . . . so long will the possibility of 
consistent and perceptive decision in this most difficult and delicate area 
of constitutional law be impeded and impaired. And so long, I fear, will 
the guarantee of true religious freedom in our pluralistic society be un-
certain and insecure. 84 
The establishment decision announced on the same day as Sherbert 
made it plain that Justice Stewart's call for attention to the problem of 
the relation between the two parts of the religion guarantee had fallen 
on deaf ears. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 85 
the Court, with only Stewart dissenting, struck down a Pennsylvania 
law it construed as requiring the reading and recitation of biblical 
passages and Christian prayers in the state's public school classrooms. 
Perhaps the fact that much of Justice Stewart's criticism of mechanical 
separationism was associated with his dissents from school prayer de-
cisions helps to explain why his insights on the interpretive problems 
were ignored. But with hindsight, the Schempp case is less remarkable 
for its result, which followed from Engel v. Vitale, 86 than for its deci-
sive affirmation of the separationist approach laid down in Everson and 
its characterization of free exercise as an individual right. 
In those respects, Schempp charted the basic course that the War-
ren and Burger Courts were to follow in the church-state area during 
the period of the rights revolution. Justice Clark's majority opinion, 
citing Everson for the proposition that the establishment language 
commands the complete separation of church and state, 87 said the pur-
pose of the free exercise provision was "to secure religious liberty in 
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil author-
ity. "88 In the cases it chose to regard as involving establishment, the 
Court endeavored to keep government apart from, and "neutral" to-
wards, religious activity. In the free exercise cases, the Court concen-
trated on protecting the religious liberty of the individual. A broad 
interpretation of establishment backed up by a bright-line test discour-
aged legislatures and administrators from accommodating or cooper-
ating with religion in any way. An individualistic construction of free 
exercise backed up by a "compelling interest" test discouraged govern-
84. 374 U.S. at 416-17. 
85. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
86. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
87. 374 U.S. at 216-17. 
88. 374 U.S. at 223. 
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ment from interfering with the religious rights of solitary individuals, 
but ignored the associational aspects of free exercise. 
To Justice Goldberg, who uneasily concurred in Schempp, it 
seemed plain that the core of the First Amendment's religion language 
was not separationism for its own sake, but freedom of religion. 89 He 
agreed that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of 
neutrality, but he saw that there were several ways in which that elu-
sive concept could produce outcomes that were far from neutral. He 
wrote: 
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation 
or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference 
and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution com-
mands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a 
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not 
only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohib-
ited by it. 90 
Justice Stewart, in dissent, continued his denunciation of the 
Court's simplistic approach to the intricate interpretive problems that 
had been brushed aside in the incorporation process: 
It is ... a fallacious oversimplification to regard [the religion language] 
as establishing a single constitutional standard of "separation of church 
and state," which can be mechanically applied in every case to delineate 
the required boundaries between government and religion. We err in the 
first place if we do not recognize, as a matter of history and as a matter 
of the imperatives of our free society, that religion and government must 
necessarily interact in countless ways. Secondly, the fact is that while in 
many contexts the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
fully complement each other, there are areas in which a doctrinaire read-
ing of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the 
Free Exercise Clause.91 
Echoing Justice Reed's early warning in McCollum about basing a 
rule of law on a figure of speech, Justice Stewart commented, "[T]he 
two relevant clauses of the First Amendment cannot accurately be re-
flected in a sterile metaphor which by its very nature may distort 
rather than illumine the problems involved in a particular case. "92 
To illustrate the conflict the Court's misreading had produced be-
tween the two clauses, Stewart offered the example of "a lonely soldier 
stationed at some faraway outpost [who] could surely complain that a 
government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral 
guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his reli-
89. 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
90. 374 U.S. at 306. 
91. 374 U.S. at 308-309 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
92. 374 U.S. at 309. 
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gion. "93 Yet, as the Court had construed establishment, the provision 
of a military chaplain could be seen as unconstitutional government 
support of religion. The best way to approach the problem, Stewart 
suggested, was to begin with the historical context of the First Amend-
ment. That amendment, he reminded the Court, was by its terms a 
limitation on the national government. The establishment provision 
was "primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be 
powerless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to 
interfere with existing state establishments."94 A dilemma was thus 
created when the establishment provision was held to have been incor-
porated via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For as Stewart noted, language that had been "designed to leave the 
States free to go their own way" had now "become a restriction upon 
their autonomy."95 
What Justice Stewart found deplorable was that the Court had 
brought a crude "mechanistic" approach to a task that required all the 
resources of the judicial craft.96 Initially, at least, the problem of the 
relation between the two provisions of the Religion Clause, com-
pounded by the difficulty of determining how the establishment lan-
guage was to apply to the states, ought to have been approached in the 
light of the concerns that had led to the adoption of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The historical evidence left Justice Stewart 
with little doubt that the "central value embodied in (he First Amend-
ment - and, more particularly, in the guarantee of 'liberty' contained 
in the Fourteenth - is the safeguarding of an individual's right to free 
exercise of his religion. "97 
Using the Schempp dispute as an example, Justice Stewart ex-
plained that recognizing religious freedom as the central value served 
by both "clauses" would not make the religion cases easy to decide. 
What rendered the school prayer cases particularly agonizing was pre-
cisely that conflicting free exercise claims were involved - those of 
parents and children who wanted religion to be part of the school day 
and those of parents and children who were offended by the practice of 
public prayer or scripture reading. The argument that the former 
should be content to relegate religion to after-school hours did not 
wash, in Stewart's view. 
For a compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life 
93. 374 U.S. at 309. 
94. 374 U.S. at 309-10. 
95. 374 U.S. at 310. 
96. 374 U.S. at 310. 
97. 374 U.S. at 312. 
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that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in 
schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. 
Viewed in this light, . . . a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is 
seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establish-
ment of a religion of secularism, or at the least, a government support of 
the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be con-
ducted only in private.98 
As Justice Stewart construed the statute involved in Schempp, it 
did not mandate morning religious exercises in every school. Rather, 
it gave permission to local school committees to decide whether or not 
to conduct such exercises, and to arrange their variety and content in a 
manner appropriate for local community conditions. As for those stu-
dents who did not wish to participate, he emphasized that it is the 
duty of government to refrain "from so structuring the school environ-
ment as to put any kind of pressure on a child to participate in those 
exercises."99 But government was not required, he believed, to insu-
late nonparticipants "from any awareness that some of their fellows 
may want to open the school day with prayer, or of the fact that there 
exist in our pluralistic society differences of religious belief."100 
In the absence of coercion upon those who do not wish to participate -
because they hold less strong beliefs, other beliefs, or no beliefs at all -
such provisions cannot ... be held to represent the type of support of 
religion barred by the Establishment Clause. For the only support 
which such rules provide for religion is the withholding of state hostility 
- a simple acknowledgment on the part of secular authorities that the 
Constitution does not require ·extirpation of all expression of religious 
belief. 101 
The challenge to government in a religiously diverse, liberal, demo-
cratic society, in Stewart's view, was not to dissolve or deny confes-
sional differences by eradicating every trace of religion from the public 
schools, but to find a fair way to accommodate them. The challenge 
for the public schools, had Stewart's view prevailed, would have been 
to try to teach tolerance, and to attempt to go beyond tolerance to 
understanding and celebrating the rich diversity, as well as the com-
mon humanity, of our "incorrigibly religious," 102 heterogeneous, pop-
ulation. As Justice Stewart summed up his vision of religious 
freedom: "What our Constitution indispensably protects is the free-
dom of each of us, be he Jew or Agnostic, Christian or Atheist, Bud-
98. 374 U.S. at 313. 
99. 374 U.S. at 316. 
100. 374 U.S. at 316-17. 
101. 374 U.S. at 316. 
102. The expression is that of Richard John Neuhaus. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED 
PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 105 (1984). 
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dhist or Freethinker, to believe or disbelieve, to worship or not 
worship, to pray or keep silent, according to his own conscience, un-
coerced and unrestrained by government."103 What Justice Stewart 
did not sufficiently appreciate is that there were other less coercive 
ways to accommodate religious expression in public settings than 
through government-sponsored prayer.104 In theory, the school 
prayer cases should have drawn attention to John Stuart Mill's forgot-
ten argument that education in a democracy is simply too important 
to be left to the government. 105 But the ideology of the common 
school was still too strong and the condition of public education had 
not yet sufficiently deteriorated for the government's near-monopoly 
on education to come into question. 
Over the next several years, on a Court composed of Chief Justice 
Warren and Justices Black, Fortas, Brennan, Douglas, Clark (suc-
ceeded by Marshall), White, and Harlan, Justice Stewart's opinions 
played little part in the development of Religion Clause law.106 The 
individual rights/separationist/antimajoritarian approach prevailed 
even through the Burger era, though it did not command a majority in 
every case. Under Chief Justice Burger's leadership, a somewhat less 
hard-edged version of separationism began to emerge. In a 1970 test 
case challenging New York City's practice of granting property tax 
exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used 
solely for worship, the Court declined to carry separationist principles 
to the extreme of striking down this traditional form of accommoda-
tion. Burger, new to the Court, took the occasion of Walz v. Tax 
Commission 101 to offer his own critique of the Court's precedents in 
the religion area, and to try to chart a more moderate approach. "The 
considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court," he 
wrote, "derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping 
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to 
103. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 319-20. 
104. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (upholding application of 
Equal Access Act to require a public school to permit voluntary student religious group meeting 
on school premises after hours on same basis as other student groups); see also infra note 259. 
105. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978). Mill 
warned that 
[a] general state education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one 
another; and as the mold in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power 
in government, ... in proportion as it i~ efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism 
over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. 
Id. at 129. 
106. See generally Rodney K. Smith, Justice Potter Stewart: A Contemporary Jurist's View of 
Religious Liberty, 59 N.D. L. REV. 183 (1983). 
107. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
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the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles."108 
He pointed out, as Justice Stewart had done in Schempp, that "[n]o 
perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of 
the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts - one that seeks to 
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement."109 
Departing from the acontextual and ahistorical approach the 
Court had taken in religion cases generally, he pointed out that tax 
exemptions for religious property are the product of an "unbroken" 
history that "covers our entire national existence."110 Such exemp-
tions, customarily accorded by the colonists, and continued by Con-
gress and state legislatures from the Founding to the present day, had 
not "le[d] to an established church or religion," but had "operated 
affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of reli-
gious belief."111 
Stating that a more compelling case would have to be made to dis-
lodge a practice so "deeply embedded" and widely accepted in our 
culture, Chief Justice Burger declined the taxpayer's invitation to sec-
ond guess the judgment of New York (and other states) in the mat-
ter.112 The legislature had determined "that certain entities that exist 
in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that fos-
ter its 'moral or mental improvement,' should not be inhibited in their 
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties 
for nonpayment of taxes."113 Religious groups, the Chief Justice em-
phasized, had not been singled out by New York for this preferential 
tax treatment. Instead, the state had "granted exemption to all houses 
of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by non-
profit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, 
playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic 
groups."114 Burger described the exemption as flowing from New 
York's "affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and 
stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification 
useful, desirable, and in the public interest."115 He expressly declined 
to justify the tax exemption on the basis of "the social welfare services 
or 'good works' that some churches perform for parishioners and 
108. 397 U.S. at 668. 
109. 397 U.S. at 670. 
110. 397 U.S. at 678. 
111. 397 U.S. at 678. 
112. 397 U.S. at 676-78. 
113. 397 U.S. at 672. 
114. 397 U.S. at 673. 
115. 397 U.S. at 673. 
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others - family counseling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to 
children," for this "would introduce an element of governmental eval-
uation ... as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus 
producing a kind of continuing ... relationship which the policy of 
neutrality seeks to minimize."116 
The Chief Justice's opinion in Walz was of a piece with other Bur-
ger opinions solicitous of the ability of communities and intermediate 
groups to set the conditions for their own flourishing and develop-
ment, 117 and with Stewart's view of the First Amendment as establish-
ing a positive liberty.118 The tax exemption flowed, as Burger saw it, 
from a considered legislative judgment that the state would prefer not 
to burden certain groups, religions among them, because the flourish-
ing of these groups was judged to be in the public interest. They were 
deemed to be valuable in themselves, and not simply because they re-
lieved the government of the burden of supplying certain social serv-
ices. The long history of the practice of exempting certain kinds of 
property from taxation, he concluded, provided ample evidence that 
the exemption had not served as the toehold for an establishment of an 
official religion in New York. 119 
The Walz opinion, in retrospect, is noteworthy as one of the rare 
acknowledgments by a Court majority that (1) arrangements claimed 
to be violations of establishment principles may in fact be key under-
pinnings of free exercise, and (2) free exercise has associational and 
institutional, as well as individual, dimensions. 120 These two aspects 
of religious freedom had been largely ignored in the Court's earlier 
free exercise opinions, while the broad establishment characterization 
effectively obscured the free exercise implications of those cases. What 
had lapsed, in the long period between the Founding and incorpora-
116. 397 U.S. at 674. 
117. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in different States vary in 
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed 
uniformity."); Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973) (legitimate state inter-
ests in controlling commercial obscenity "include the interest of the public in the quality of life 
and the total community environment"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (protect-
ing the traditional "way of life and mode of education" of Old Order Amish). 
118. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
119. 397 U.S. at 678. 
120. Any distinction between individual and associational freedom in the religion area is 
difficult to maintain. Michael Sandel has persuasively argued that the Court's long practice of 
treating religion as the product of individual choice, and of regarding religious freedom as in the 
service of individual autonomy, leaves out of consideration the beliefs and practices of the vast 
numbers of religious Americans to whom the existence of a worshipping community is essential 
to religious experience. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in 
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 87 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990) [hereinaf-
ter ARTICLES OF FAITH]. 
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tion, was the understanding that the Bill of Rights protects certain 
social structures as well as individuals - churches in the First 
Amendment, community militia in the Second, and juries in the Sixth 
and Seventh. 121 Walz thus opened the door, not only to a milder ver-
sion of separationism, but to a broader, more authentic, concept of free 
exercise. 
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, attempted to limit the damage 
to separationist principles. There were only "two basic secular pur-
poses for granting real property tax exemptions to religious organiza-
tions," he wrote. 122 The first was the social welfare purpose that Chief 
Justice Burger's majority opinion explicitly rejected. The second was 
the promotion of pluralism. 
Government may properly include religious institutions among the vari-
ety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each 
group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enter-
prise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society .... To this end, New 
York extends its exemptions not only to religious and social service 
organizations but also to scientific, literary, bar, library, patriotic, and 
historical groups, and generally to institutions "organized exclusively for 
the moral or mental improvement of men and women."123 
... It is true that each church contributes to the pluralism of our 
society through its purely religious activities, but the state encourages 
these activities not because it champions religion per se but because it 
values religion among a variety of private, nonprofit enterprises that con-
tribute to the diversity of the Nation.124 
Straining to keep the Walz holding within the narrowest possible con-
fines, Justice Brennan concluded that the exemption was valid only 
because it did not single out religion for special treatment, and because 
it served the secular purposes of providing social services and fostering 
diversity. 
A year after the Walz decision, Chief Justice Burger attempted to 
extricate the Court from the sorts of difficulties and inconsistencies 
that in his view had marred establishment jurisprudence. Writing for 
the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, he expanded on the critique he had 
begun in Walz of the absolutist conception of separation. 125 The "line 
of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and varia-
ble barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
121. See infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text. 
122. 397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
123. 397 U.S. at 689 (quoting N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX§ 420, subd. 1). 
124. 397 U.S. at 693. 
125. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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ship."126 To replace the "wall" metaphor with what he believed to be 
a more workable approach, he drew on prior cases, including his own 
opinion in Walz, to devise a three-part test for determining when a 
particular governmental action would pass muster under the establish-
ment language. The test requires a challenged governmental action to 
cross each of three hurdles: (1) it must have a secular purpose, (2) its 
principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, 
and (3) it must not foster excessive government entanglement with 
religion. 127 
In the Lemon case itself, the entanglement prong proved fatal for 
the two statutory schemes before the Court: one reimbursing nonpub-
lic elementary and secondary schools for the cost of teachers' salaries, 
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects; the 
other directly providing teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic ele-
mentary schools with a supplement of fifteen percent of their annual 
salary. Both programs, according to Chief Justice Burger, impermissi-
bly entangled the government with religion. For to be certain that 
public funds were in fact being used for secular purposes, there would 
have to be a degree of "surveillance" that would run afoul of the new 
test.12s 
The Lemon test did represent a more realistic version of the sepa-
rationist approach, but it did not deviate from the main lines laid 
down in Everson and McCollum. As Justice White pointed out in his 
partial dissent, the Court continued to ignore the fact that the estab-
lishment provision "coexists in the First Amendment with the Free 
Exercise Clause and the latter is surely relevant in [school] cases such 
as these."129 Moreover, Burger's concern about the disorderly state of 
Religion Clause law did not incline him to reexamine its foundations 
or to question its implicit assumptions. 
It soon became apparent that the Lemon test would not succeed in 
introducing consistency into the Court's pattern of decisions, for it 
proved extraordinarily malleable and was invoked in support of highly 
divergent results. By 1973, the Chief Justice found himself dissenting 
from a majority opinion by Justice Powell, applying the Lemon test to 
strike down New York's program of tuition grants and tax credits to 
parents whose children attended religious schools. 130 A Court major-
ity's expansive understanding of what it means to advance religion, or 
126. 403 U.S. at 614. 
127. 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
128. 403 U.S. at 619, 621. 
129. 403 U.S. at 665. 
130. Committee on Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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what constitutes excessive entanglement between church and state, 
continued, for the next decade, to signal that a formidable gauntlet 
awaited legislative and local experiments with creative use of nongov-
ernmental agencies to deliver educational and other social services. 
Despite his unwillingness to break with separationism as the driv-
ing force in establishment cases, Chief Justice Burger did garner a ma-
jority for an opinion manifesting an unprecedented judicial sensitivity 
to the associational dimension of religious liberty in a free exercise 
case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 131 decided the year after the Lemon test was 
announced. The case arose when certain members of Old Order 
Amish religious communities were convicted of violating a Wisconsin 
law that required parents to send their children to school until the age 
of sixteen. A stark conflict was presented between the state's undis-
putedly strong interest in providing for the education and develop-
ment of all its citizens and the Amish parents' claim that "their 
children's attendance at high school, public or private [beyond the age 
of fourteen], was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life" and 
would endanger their and their children's salvation.13z 
What is especially noteworthy about Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion for the Court in support of the position of the Amish parents is 
that it adopted a broader view of free exercise and manifested a greater 
degree of interest in the record than had been characteristic in religion 
cases up to that time. The Chief Justice described at length the nature 
of the interest of the Amish groups in receiving an exemption from the 
state requirement. The Amish rejected high school for their children 
because it exposed them to " 'worldly' influence in conflict with their 
beliefs."133 In high school, the Amish believed, their children would 
be taught to value intellectual and scientific accomplishment, self-dis-
tinction, competitiveness, and worldly success. They preferred that 
their children be socialized into a community based on "informal 
learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intel-
lect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, 
rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration 
with, contemporary worldly society."134 
Socialization of the Amish children in the high schools instead of 
home education took them 
away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the cru-
cial and formative adolescent period of life. During this period, the chil-
131. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
132. 406 U.S. at 209. 
133. 406 U.S. at 211. 
134. 406 U.S. at 211. 
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dren must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-
reliance and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an 
Amish farmer or housewife .... [T]he Amish child must also grow in his 
faith and his relationship to the Amish community if he is to be prepared 
to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult baptism. In short, high 
school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith . . . 
interposes a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the 
Amish religious community. 135 
Meticulous record-building work at the trial level by lawyers for 
the Amish appears to have helped convince the Chief Justice that 
nothing less than the perpetuation of the Amish way of life was at 
stake. He noted that an expert on the Amish had testified that high 
school would not only inflict "great psychological harm to Amish chil-
dren, because of the conflicts it would produce, but would also . . . 
ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church 
community as it exists in the United States today." 136 The Amish free 
exercise claim, according to the Chief Justice, was an attempt to find 
shelter from modem society's "hydraulic insistence on conformity to 
majoritarian standards."137 The Wisconsin law presented "a very real 
threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as 
they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated 
into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more 
tolerant region." 138 
Having characterized the interest of the Amish in gaining an ex--
emption from the state's compulsory education laws as a strong one, 
the Chief Justice turned to the state's interest in refusing to grant them 
an exemption. Citing Sherbert v. Verner, he wrote that "only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can over-
balance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 139 The 
state's compulsory education policy was an important one, he began, 
motivated by the public interest in producing self-reliant and produc-
tive citizens. But as applied to the Amish, he found it inapposite. 
Whatever their idiosyncracies as seen by the majority, this record 
strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful 
social unit within our society, even if apart from the conventional "main-
stream." Its members are productive and very law-abiding members of 
society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern forms. 140 
Since Wisconsin had presented the Court with no "strong" evidence to 
135. 406 U.S. at 211-12. 
136. 406 U.S. at 212. 
137. 406 U.S. at 217. 
138. 406 U.S. at 218. 
139. 406 U.S. at 215 (citing, inter alia, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
140. 406 U.S. at 222. 
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the contrary, Chief Justice Burger declined to accept the state's con-
tention that uneducated Amish children would become "burdens on 
society should they determine to leave the Amish faith." 141 He went 
on to observe that the "independence and successful social functioning 
of the Amish community for a period approaching almost three centu-
ries and more than 200 years in this country" rendered the state's as-
sertion that one or two more years of schooling were necessary "at 
best ... speculative."142 Burger concluded by emphasizing that the 
case involved the "fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with 
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their 
children."143 
What makes the Yoder opinion a landmark in free exercise law is 
not its bare result, but the careful attention accorded by Chief Justice 
Burger to the facts, and what one might call his holistic or "ecologi-
cal" understanding of what was at stake in the case. Much more was 
at issue, he saw, than the immediate disagreement over how individual 
school children would spend their day. The retention of the ability of 
the Amish community to set conditions for its own long-term perpetu-
ation was the real heart of the respondents' claim. The Court's will-
ingness to accord constitutional standing to that aspect of free exercise 
represented a significant, if fleeting, recognition that religious experi-
ence is not always a matter solely involving "the individual man and 
his God."144 Yoder's implicit acknowledgment that the religious expe-
rience often cannot be separated from the fate of a community - that 
it may bind the present with the past and the future and play an im-
portant role in shaping the character of its members - was an open-
ing to a more capacious approach to free exercise. It stands in marked 
contrast with the cramped vision of free exercise that had played 
havoc with the Court's understanding of both the establishment and 
free exercise provisions of the First Amendment since the 1940s. 
As in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 145 the free exercise rights in Yoder 
received a significant boost from their close association with other im-
portant interests with constitutional status, in this case family and as-
sociational rights. The fact that the associational dimension of free 
exercise involved in Yoder was that of a "quaint" minority religion 
probably helped the Chief Justice to persuade all but one of his col-
leagues on that occasion. The Chief Justice himself stressed the nar-
141. 406 U.S. at 225. 
142. 406 U.S. at 226-27. 
143. 406 U.S. at 232. 
144. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 57-58 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
145. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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rowness of the holding in this respect, emphasizing that the Amish are 
not a group with a "recently discovered" process for educating chil-
dren, and that "few other religious groups or sects could make" such a 
"convincing showing" as to outweigh the powerful state interest in-
volved in compulsory education.146 Only Justice Douglas dissented, 
and then only in part, as to those Amish children who had not ex-
pressed a preference in the matter. t47 
The narrowness of Yoder was reemphasized eleven years later in 
Bob Jones University v. United States, 148 where the Court in a unani-
mous opinion 149 (written by Chief Justice Burger) rejected the free ex-
ercise claim of a private university stripped of its tax exempt status by 
the federal government because of its religiously motivated policies 
against interracial dating. In no uncertain terms, the Chief Justice 
made it clear that the religion claims would have to bow to the strong 
governmental interest relating to one of the nation's most serious so-
cial problems. "Whatever may be the rationale for such private 
schools' policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial dis-
crimination in education is contrary to public policy."150 The govern-
mental interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education 
prevailed, he said, over any free exercise interests the school might be 
able to demonstrate.1st 
Given the expansive approach to personal liberties the Warren and 
Burger courts adopted, one might have expected free exercise, at least 
in the narrower, individual sense, to have flourished under the Sher-
bert compelling interest test and to have benefited from the increased 
protection accorded to individual rights generally by the Court in the 
1960s and 1970s. But that was not the case. For, even during the 
rights revolution, except in Yoder and in the unemployment compen-
sation cases, free exercise values were regularly subordinated by the 
courts to governmental interests.152 
146. 406 U.S. at 235, 236. 
147. Stating that "[r]eligion is an individual experience," Douglas wrote that students have 
the right "to be masters of their own destiny" and that the Court should not assist parents in 
barring their children "forever ... from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that 
we have today." 406 U.S. at 243, 245. 
148. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
149. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion but joined the part of the Court's opinion 
dealing with the free exercise claim. 461 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist 
dissented on other grounds, but agreed that a denial of tax exempt status "would not infringe on 
petitioners' First Amendment rights." 461 U.S. at 622 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
150. 461 U.S. at 595. 
151. 461 U.S. at 603-04. 
152. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. l; 
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1109 (1990). Sherbert's very existence, however, may have served to shelter free exercise by 
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Nowhere have the deleterious effects of the Court's excessively nar-
row view of free exercise and obsessively separationist interpretation of 
establishment been more apparent than in the cases involving schools. 
In a judicial pincer movement, one line of decisions leading out from 
McCollum 153 through Engel v. Vitale 154 requires the public schools to 
be rigorously secular, while another has struck down most forms of 
assistance to parents who fear for their children's welfare in educa-
tional systems that are often actively promoting values profoundly at 
odds with the family's religious convictions.155 Despite the Court's 
willingness to give establishment an expansive interpretation, it has 
never acknowledged or come to terms with Justice Stewart's point that 
rigorous separationism is itself a kind of establishment because of the 
degree to which a compulsory state education system structures a 
child's life. 156 The net result has been that a crucial aspect of religious 
freedom remains unavailable to those families that are not wealthy 
enough to afford private education after paying their local taxes to 
support public schools. Nor is private education an entirely safe har-
bor from excessively intrusive and homogenizing regulation. 
In a school case decided in 1985, Justice Brennan took the separa-
tionist Lemon test to such extremes that he may have hastened its 
eventual downfall. In Aguilar v. Felton, 151 the Court struck down a 
Great Society program that had been designed to provide federal aid 
to local agencies to assist educationally deprived children from low-
income families. The New York City program involved in Aguilar 
had for nineteen years furnished public school teachers who provided 
remedial services and instruction to special needs children from the 
city's poorest neighborhoods. In the 1980s, six taxpayers attacked this 
longstanding and successful program as a violation of the establish-
ment provision because it made these services available in private reli-
gious schools as well as in public schools. In the school year 1981-
1982, 13.2% of the students eligible to be aided by the program were 
enrolled in private schools. Of that group, 84% were in Roman Cath-
olic schools and 8 % in Hebrew schools. 
signaling to legislators and other government officials that religious exemptions from certain laws 
would be required. As to this deterrent effect, see text accompanying note 266 infra. 
153. Illinois ex rel. Mccollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1943); see supra text accom-
panying notes 47-58. 
154. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
155. The cases are collected in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 
110-12 (1985). 
156. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
157. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
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Under the program in these religious schools, regular employees of 
the public schools who had volunteered to teach in the nonpublic 
schools provided instruction in remedial reading, remedial mathemat-
ics, and English as a second language. The city's Bureau of Nonpublic 
School Reimbursement made the teacher assignments, and the instruc-
tors were supervised by field personnel who tried to pay at least one 
unannounced visit per month. The supervisors of the field personnel 
also paid occasional unannounced visits to the classes. The city em-
ployees working in the religious schools were under instructions to 
avoid involvement with religious activities at the schools, to bar reli-
gious materials from their classrooms, to select the students them-
selves, to minimize contact with private school personnel, and to 
ensure that the parochial school administrators removed all religious 
symbols from the classrooms used by the public school personnel.158 
On those facts, the Court, by a five-to-four majority, found that the 
program impermissibly entangled the state with religion. Justice 
Brennan's opinion for the Court gave several reasons for finding the 
program constitutionally infirm within the Lemon framework. "When 
the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of 
religious significance," he warned, "the freedom of religious belief of 
those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when 
the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secu-
lar." 159 In addition, the religious freedom of adherents of the denomi-
nation is jeopardized by the governmental intrusion into sacred 
matters. 
After discussing the Court's previous religion and public education 
decisions, Justice Brennan concluded that because of the "pervasively 
sectarian environment" of the schools and because teachers provided 
the assistance, the New York program would require permanent and 
extensive state supervision. "We have long recognized that underlying 
the Establishment Clause is 'the objective . . . to prevent, as far as 
possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of 
the other.' " 160 In this case, he wrote, intrusion by the state was 
unavoidable: 
[T]he detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required to 
158. 473 U.S. at 404-07. The Court's appreciation of the issues in Aguilar may have been 
colored by the fact that Aguilar's companion case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373 (1985), raised more serious establishment questions. One of the programs at issue in Grand 
Rapids, unlike in Aguilar, involved the use of public funds to pay full-time employees of religious 
schools to teach secular subjects under the supervision of religious school administrators. Grand 
Rapids, 473 U.S. at 376-77. 
159. 473 U.S. at 409-10. 
160. 473 U.S. at 413 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). 
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maintain New York City's Title I program can only produce "a kind of 
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks 
to mi11lmize." [quoting Walz v. Tax Commission] The numerous judg-
ments that must be made by agents of the city concern matters that may 
be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to 
the controlling denominations. As government agents must make these 
judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines in-
crease. At the same time "[t]he picture of state inspectors prowling the 
halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely 
raises more than an imagined specter of governmental 'secularization of 
a creed.' " 161 
Brennan concluded that the remedial program violated the Lemon re-
quirements that "neither the State nor Federal Government shall pro-
mote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the 
advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of 
church and state in the administration of those benefits."162 
The conclusory nature and perfunctory reasoning of Brennan's 
majority opinion drew a series of sharp dissents, revealing that several 
members of the Court were no longer willing to take separationism to 
the limit. Chief Justice Burger, then in his last year on the Court, 
seemed appalled at the use to which the test he had devised in Lemon 
had been put. Focusing on the "human cost" of the Court's decision, 
he caustically expressed his doubt that "programs designed to prevent 
a generation of children from growing up without being able to read 
effectively" were steps toward an established church: 
The notion that denying these services to students in religious schools is 
a neutral act to protect us from an Established Church has no support in 
logic, experience, or history. Rather than showing ... neutrality ... it 
exhibits nothing less than hostility toward religion and the children who 
attend church-sponsored schools. 163 
Justice White, a longtime dissenter from the Court's interpretation 
of the establishment provision in school cases, took the occasion to 
reiterate his view that those decisions were "not required by the First 
Amendment and were contrary to the long-range interests of the 
country."164 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent took the Court to task for striking 
down the program on the basis of a 
"Catch-22" paradox of its own creation ... whereby aid must be super-
vised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause 
161. 473 U.S. at 414 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 650 (opinion of Brennan, J.)). 
162. 473 U.S. at 414. 
163. 473 U.S. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
164. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1984) (White, J., dissenting 
from the decisions in both Aguilar and Grand Rapids). 
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an entanglement .... [W]e have indeed traveled far afield from the con-
cerns which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we 
rely on gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets 
an entirely secular need.165 
It was Justice O'Connor's dissent, however, that delivered the 
most telling criticisms of the indifference to practical consequences 
that characterized the majority's opinion. Indeed, her opinion in 
Aguilar stands as the definitive rebuke to the Court's general approach 
to establishment issues from 1947 onward. She chided the majority 
for its lack of attention to the actual operation of the program it struck 
down, for the abstract character of its reasoning, and for its apparent 
unconcern with the effects of the decision on the lives and prospects of 
20,000 special needs children from the poorest families in New York 
City, as well as children in similar programs in other parts of the 
country. 
This holding rests on the theory ... that public school teachers who set 
foot on parochial school premises are likely to bring religion into their 
classes, and that the supervision necessary to prevent religious teaching 
would unduly entangle church and state. Even if this theory were valid 
in the abstract, it cannot validly be applied to New York City's 19-year-
old Title I program. The Court greatly exaggerates the degree of super-
vision necessary to prevent public school teachers from inculcating reli-
gion, and thereby demonstrates the flaws of a test that condemns benign 
cooperation between church and state.166 
Justice O'Connor thought it useful to describe the Title I program 
more fully than the majority had. She began by noting that the pro-
gram represented Congress' recognition that "poor academic perform-
ance by disadvantaged children is part of the cycle of poverty," and its 
consequent decision to make a special effort to reach children who 
would not receive the educational services they needed without gov-
ernmental assistance.167 The sole reason disclosed by the record for 
offering classes funded under Title I on the premises of parochial 
schools, she noted, was that "alternative means to reach the disadvan-
taged parochial school students - such as instruction ... at the near-
est public school ... were unsuccessful."168 The record afforded little 
basis, she pointed out, for the fears of the majority that " 'state-paid 
instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the reli-
gious schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctrinate 
the students in particular religious tenets at public expense' "; that 
165. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
166. 473 U.S. at 421 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
167. 473 U.S. at 422. 
168. 473 U.S. at 423. 
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state-provided education in religious school buildings threatens to con-
vey a message of state support for religion to students and the general 
public; and that the program subsidizes the religious function of the 
parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their secular 
education.169 In fact, the record disclosed not a single instance of reli-
gious "inculcation" or advancement by the public teachers during the 
nineteen years the program had been in operation. In sum, she con-
cluded that the majority's "abstract theories" about how the program 
in question "might possibly advance religion dissolve in the face of 
experience in New York City."170 
The absence of evidence to support the majority's fear of religious 
advancement was hardly surprising in O'Connor's commonsensical 
view: 
New York City's public Title I instructors are professional educators 
who can and do follow instructions not to inculcate religion in their 
classes. They are unlikely to be influenced by the sectarian nature of the 
parochial schools where they teach, not only because they are carefully 
supervised by public officials, but also because the vast majority of them 
visit several different schools each week and are not of the same religion 
as their parochial students.171 
With some asperity, she remarked that it is "not intuitively obvious 
that a dedicated public school teacher will tend to disobey instructions 
and commence proselytizing students at public expense merely be-
cause the classroom is within a parochial school."172 
What was abundantly clear, and what the majority had slighted, 
according to O'Connor, was that the Title I program had provided 
significant benefits to the public and the students. The record showed 
that "impoverished school children are being helped to overcome 
learning deficits, improving their test scores, and receiving a significant 
boost in their struggle to obtain both a thorough education and the 
opportunities that flow from it."173 As for the majority's contention 
that the supervision necessary to prevent the inculcation of religion 
creates excessive entanglement, she pointed out that the degree of su-
pervision required "does not differ significantly from the supervision 
any public school teacher receives, regardless of the location of the 
classroom." If extensive supervision were really necessary to prevent 
the public school teachers from inculcating religion, she pointed out, 
that "would require us to close our public schools, for there is always 
169. 473 U.S. at 423-24 (quoting Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 373). 
170. 473 U.S. at 424. 
171. 473 U.S. at 425. 
172. 473 U.S. at 427. 
173. 473 U.S. at 425. 
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some chance that a public school teacher will bring religion into the 
classroom, regardless of its location."174- She also dismissed the major-
ity's ritual invocation of political divisiveness, pointing again to the 
actual facts of the case: "There is little record support for the proposi-
tion that New York City's admirable Title I program has ignited any 
controversy other than this litigation."115 
The proper way to approach the matter, Justice O'Connor argued, 
was through the substitute for the Lemon test that she had proposed 
the previous year. 176 "If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advanc-
ing or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely because it 
requires some ongoing cooperation between church and state or some 
state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance 
religion." 177 
The Justice closed her opinion with a consideration of the practical 
effects of the majority's holding. She noted that public school students 
would be unaffected, and that some parochial school students might be 
spared the loss of instruction under Title I through "programs offered 
off the premises of their schools - possibly in portable classrooms just 
over the edge of the school property."178 The unlucky children who 
would "lose" are "those in cities where it is not economically and lo-
gistically feasible to provide public facilities for remedial education ad-
jacent to the parochial school. But this subset is significant, for it 
includes more than 20,000 New York City schoolchildren and un-
counted others elsewhere in the country."179 For that large group of 
needy children, she said, the decision in Aguilar was "tragic."180 
The Court deprives them of a program that offers a meaningful chance at 
success in life, and it does so on the untenable theory that public school 
teachers (most of whom are of different faiths than their students) are 
likely to start teaching religion merely because they have walked across 
the threshold of a parochial school .... I cannot close my eyes to the fact 
that, over almost two decades, New York City's public school teachers 
have helped thousands of impoverished parochial school children to 
overcome educational disadvantages without once attempting to incul-
cate religion. Their praiseworthy efforts have not eroded and do not 
174. 473 U.S. at 428-29. For illustrations of Justice O'Connor's point, see Bishop v. Aronov, 
926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (state university professor interjected religious beliefs during 
instructional time); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989), ajfd., 921F.2d1047 
(10th Cir. 1990) (elementary school teacher silently read Bible during classroom hours in view of 
students). 
175. 473 U.S. at 429. 
176. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
177. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
178. 473 U.S. at 430-31. 
179. 473 U.S. at 431. 
180. 473 U.S. at 431. 
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threaten the religious liberty assured by the Establishment Clause.181 
Like the McCollum case that had squelched efforts at interfaith 
cooperation in Illinois nearly four decades earlier,182 Aguilar deployed 
abstract separationist logic and baseless evocations of sectarian strife 
to strike down a benign legislative program worked out by Congress 
after extensive cooperative effort with and testimony from a wide vari-
ety of religious organizations. Moreover, the decision seemed to place 
religion, alone among human activities, in a suspect category. Nor-
mally, a litigant challenging a governmental action would have the 
burden of showing that the activity in question violated the Constitu-
tion. But Aguilar inverted the usual presumption, by striking down 
the remedial program because the government could not prove there 
would never be unconstitutional advancement of religion by public 
school teachers. 183 By making the eradication of government support 
for religion the chief aim of establishment provision interpretation, the 
Court had gone to extremes in striking down forms of governmental 
accommodation of religious belief and exercise of the sort that are in 
place in every other tolerant, liberal, democracy.184 
At first glance, it seems difficult to reconcile Justice Brennan's ex-
aggerated suspicion regarding religion in the Aguilar case with his vig-
orous advocacy of aggressive free exercise protection stretching back 
to his Sherbert opinion in 1963.185 But his uncompromising separa-
tionism in establishment cases and his commitment to protecting cer-
tain types of free exercise are both consistent with his view of the 
Supreme Court's role as a bulwark against majoritarian tyranny and as 
the champion of selected individual and minority rights. The place of 
the First Amendment's religion guarantee in Justice Brennan's judicial 
philosophy is illuminated by comparing his Aguilar opinion with a dis-
sent he filed three years later in a free exercise case, where he attacked 
the Court's majority for insensitivity to the associational religious 
rights of members of a minority religion. 
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 186 the 
Court held that the free exercise provision did not prohibit the federal 
government from allowing timber harvesting in, or the construction of 
a road through, a portion of government-owned property, even though 
181. 473 U.S. at 431. 
182. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1943); see supra text accom· 
panying notes 47-48. 
183. Mark E. Chopko, Has U.S. Society Become Anti-Religious?, CATHOLIC LEAGUE NEWS· 
LEITER, Nov. 1991, at 5, 11. 
184. See CHARLES L. GLENN, CHOICE OF SCHOOLS IN SIX NATIONS (1989). 
185. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra text accompanying notes 71-84. 
186. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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the land in question had traditionally been used for religious purposes 
by members of three American Indian tribes, and the proposed activ-
ity would have a serious impact on their religious life.187 Justice Bren-
nan's dissent stressed the effect the proposed activity would have on a 
fragile religious community: 
As the Forest Service's commissioned study ... explains, for Native 
Americans religion is not a discrete sphere of activity separate from all 
others, and any attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life "is 
in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian cate-
gories."188 ... Thus, for most Native Americans, "[t]he area of worship 
cannot be delineated from social, political, cultu[ral], and other areas o[t] 
Indian lifestyle." ... A pervasive feature of this lifestyle is the individ-
ual's relationship with the natural world; this relationship, which can 
accurately though somewhat incompletely be characterized as one of 
stewardship, forms the core of what might be called, for want of a better 
nomenclature, the Indian religious experience.189 
Justice Brennan demonstrated in Lyng that he was well able to 
understand that more than just the individual free exercise of the rela-
tively few Indians who used the sacred site was at stake. "Although 
few Tribe members actually make medicine at the most powerful sites, 
the entire Tribe's welfare hinges on the success of the individual prac-
titioners." 190 He also showed himself able, on this occasion, to take an 
ecological view of free exercise, as Chief Justice Burger had done in 
Yoder. 191 Justice Brennan noted that "we have recognized that laws 
that affect spiritual development by impeding the integration of chil-
dren into the religious community or by increasing the expense of ad-
herence to religious principles - in short, laws that frustrate or inhibit 
religious practice - trigger the protections of the constitutional guar-
antee." 192 What was at stake in Lyng, he saw, was not merely the free 
187. 485 U.S. at 451-53. 
188. 485 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting D. TuEODORATUS, CULTURAL RE-
SOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, SIX RIVERS NATIONAL 
FOREST (1979)). 
189. 485 U.S. at 460 (quoting American Indian Religious Freedom, Hearings on S. J. Res. 102 
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1978) (statement of 
Barney Old Coyote, Crow Tribe) [hereinafter Hearings]). 
190. 485 U.S. at 462. 
191. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 131-44. 
192. 485 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Justice Brennan's concurring opinion 
in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), in which he described the 
connection between individual free exercise and protecting the autonomy of religious 
communities: 
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation 
in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of 
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals. . . . 
Solicitude for a church's ability to [define itself] reflects the idea that furtherance of the 
autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well. 
483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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exercise of the individuals who actually used the disputed sites, but the 
entire communities to which they were spiritually connected. 
Justice Brennan's eloquent and persuasive description of the way 
in which Native American religion is inextricably woven into the rest 
of life implied that such integration is alien to the Western tradition. 
To "attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life,'' he claimed, 
"is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian 
categories."193 But those "non-Indian categories" that rigidly sepa-
rate the secular and the religious are not part of some generic "West-
ern" inheritance, as Brennan seemed to assume. They are the product 
of a particular philosophy that has found its fullest expression only in 
the laws of countries attached to pre-1989 communism, and in certain 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to which he himself had been a 
major contributor. 
The categories Brennan found so inappropriate to Native Ameri-
can religion in Lyng would strike many other Americans as equally 
inapplicable to their religious experience. For a fundamental error of 
many of the religion cases Justice Brennan participated in was pre-
cisely their failure to recognize that, for vast numbers of American 
women and men, religion is as inseparable from the rest of social life as 
it is for the Native Americans involved in Lyng. For many, perhaps 
most, Americans, "[t]he area of worship cannot be delineated,'' as 
Brennan stated in Lyng, "from social, political, cultu[ral], and other 
areas" of life.194 
How, then, is one to explain the difference between the Brennan of 
the establishment cases and the Brennan of the free exercise cases? 
Why did he treat religion as a private individual experience in the for-
mer, while he was, on occasion, ready to see it as inseparable from the 
rest of life and associational in the latter? One might try to reconcile 
the positions by arguing that in both sets of opinions he was merely 
attempting to enforce government neutrality, in the establishment 
cases blocking government favoritism and in the free exercise cases 
government hostility. This explanation founders, however, on the arti-
ficiality of the distinction between the two classes of cases. Which, for 
example, evinces more government favoritism for a religion - a gov-
ernment program that permits a public school teacher to teach reme-
dial reading to poor students, including those who happen to attend 
religious schools (Aguilar}, or a government decision to divert one of 
193. 485 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting D. THEODORATUS, supra note 188). 
194. 485 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Hearings, supra note 189). 
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its roads, built on public land, in order to protect the area for worship 
by a particular religious group (Lyng)? 
The apparent contradiction disappears, however, if we hypothesize 
that Brennan's approach to the religion provisions was driven by a 
vision of constitutionalism in which the Bill of Rights was primarily a 
charter for judges to defend individuals and small or unpopular minor-
ity groups against majoritarian infringement. In this light, Brennan's 
Religion Clause jurisprudence is all of a piece. In the establishment 
cases, he used separationism as a device to block what he perceived as 
attempts by large religious groups to expand their role in public life. 
In free exercise cases, he was comfortable with governmental accom-
modation to protect individuals and small or unpopular religious mi-
norities. In the former, he characterized religion as individual and 
private; in the latter, he could envision it as associational and insepara-
ble from other aspects of life. He shifted easily from one mode of 
Religion Clause interpretation to the other as the occasion demanded. 
Justice Brennan's vision of the Religion Clauses as checks on state 
power designed primarily to protect those individuals who are not 
members of the numerically dominant faiths prevailed on the Court 
through the period of the rights revolution. Looking back over the 
development of Religion Clause jurisprudence from the first incorpo-
ration cases up to Aguilar, one can see that this body of law is not 
quite so incomprehensible as it is often said to be. To be sure, it is not 
notably characterized by the reasoned elaboration of principles 
grounded in constitutional text or tradition. Nor does it display much 
evidence of a sustained collegial effort to discern the underlying pur-
poses and values of the religion provisions of the First Amendment, 
and to effectuate them in a reasonably consistent way. Nevertheless, 
and despite some anomalies, the fact patterns and outcomes in these 
cases do reflect with a fair degree of consistency a strict separationist 
vision with an antimajoritarian gloss. That approach produced credi-
ble analyses of individual and minority free exercise cases, but regu-
larly sacrificed freedom of religion to the value of separation in 
establishment cases. As Justice Kennedy was to observe as the Court 
moved into a new phase, this approach created "classes of religions 
based on the relative numbers of their adherents," and consigned "reli-
gions enjoying the largest following . . . to the status of least favored 
faiths. " 195 
By the mid-1980s, however, the hold of strict separationism was 
195. Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 677 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (1989). 
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less secure on a changing Court.196 In retrospect, 1985 was a water-
shed year in Religion Clause interpretation, for dissents filed in two 
cases decided that year provided strong pragmatic and theoretical jus-
tifications for reconsidering at least the establishment precedents. Jus-
tice O'Connor's Aguilar dissent laid bare the destructiveness of the 
mechanical separationist approach in practical and human terms. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, dissenting in Wallace v. Jaffree, made it plain that 
strict separationism had no basis in constitutional text, history or tra-
dition.197 In both cases, Justice Powell had provided a crucial fifth 
vote for the separationist view.198 In 1986, Rehnquist became Chief 
Justice upon Burger's retirement, and Antonin Scalia joined the 
Court. When Anthony Kennedy took Powell's seat the following 
year, the Court seemed poised to take a fresh look at the religion lan-
guage of the First Amendment. 
III. THE EMERGING DEFERENCE DOCTRINE 
In the Religion Clause decisions of the Rehnquist Court, a new 
approach has begun to emerge, but its contours are not yet fully clear. 
The salient characteristic of the emerging approach is the disposition 
on the part of an otherwise fragmented majority to exercise great re-
straint in setting aside the decisions of other branches of government 
in the church-state area. Thus the Court has produced decisions up-
holding legislation that previously might have been seen as violating 
the Establishment Clause, 199 but it has also refused to invalidate regu-
lations or laws that burden individual,200 associational,201 and institu-
tional202 free exercise. This trend has prompted some observers to 
conclude that the Court is effectively removing the religious freedom 
guarantee from the Bill of Rights by relegating most of the problems 
196. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Establishment Clause not violated by Minnesota 
statute permitting parents of parochial school students to deduct tuition, textbook, and transpor-
tation expenses); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Establishment Clause not violated by 
Nebraska legislature's chaplaincy practice); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (Establish· 
ment Clause not violated by inclusion of creche in Pawtucket, Rhode Island's Christmas 
display). 
197. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
198. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), was a five-to-four decision. Wallace was a six-
to-three decision with O'Connor concurring only in the judgment. 
199. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 
(1988). 
200. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1575 (1990); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 
U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 
(1986). 
201. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
202. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board 
of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
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in the area to the political process. 203 
In retrospect, the transition to the new stance seems to have begun 
in the final years of the Burger Court in a free exercise case that by 
itself did not clearly prefigure a move to an across-the-board posture of 
deference. Goldman v. Weinberger involved a citizen caught in a con-
flict between his religious obligation, as an orthodox Jewish rabbi, to 
wear a yarmulke, and the dress regulations of the U.S. Air Force, 
which required him to keep his head uncovered while on duty in-
doors.204 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, rejecting Captain 
Goldman's claim for an exemption from the military dress code on 
free exercise grounds, did not treat the case as presenting a conflict 
between an individual and government in the abstract, but rather as 
involving Captain Goldman's obligations to a unique form of commu-
nity. Quoting from an earlier opinion to the effect that" 'the military 
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian soci-
ety,' "205 Rehnquist described the requirements of the military com-
munity at some length. 
The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the ex-
tent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First 
Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinc-
tive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps .... The essence 
of military service "is the subordination of the desires and interests of the 
individual to the needs of the service."206 . . . "[W]ithin the military 
community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there 
is in the larger civilian community."201 
Declining to apply the compelling interest standard of Sherbert to 
the special situation of the military, Rehnquist said, "[W]hen evaluat-
ing whether military needs justify a particular restriction on relig-
iously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the 
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative 
importance of a particular military interest."208 The Court's deference 
in Goldman to the Air Force's considered judgment that its dress code 
fostered "the overall group mission" was not mere reflexive yielding to 
"government."209 It was, rather, an acknowledgment of the impor-
tance of the military as an essential and special society within the 
203. See Edward M. Gaffney et al., An Open Letter to the Religious Community, FIRST 
THINGS, Mar. 1991, at 44, 45; Laycock, supra note 152, at 12; Richard John Neuhaus, Polygamy, 
Peyote, and the Public Peace, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1990. 
204. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
205. 475 U.S. at 506 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)). 
206. 475 U.S. at 507 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 354 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)). 
207. 475 U.S. at 507 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S., 733, 751 (1974)). 
208. 475 U.S. at 507. 
209. 475 U.S. at 508. 
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larger society, and of the need of that unique subgroup to order the 
conditions for its own proper functioning and development. What 
gives the Goldman case its special poignancy is that Captain Goldman 
was also subject to obligations imposed on him by another community, 
a community of faith that he had not ''joined" but to which he simply 
belonged. He was not asserting his individual preference against the 
dress code, but rather his duty to another code. 
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, acknowledged the force of the mili-
tary's position, but stressed that there was, after all, a constitutional 
right weighing heavily on the other side of the dispute.210 Justice 
Brennan's dissent, by contrast, accorded no weight at all to the judg-
ment of the Air Force about what conditions were necessary to main-
tain its discipline and esprit.211 He took the occasion to express more 
explicitly than ever his particular reading of the religion provisions of 
the First Amendment as protecting "the rights of members of minor-
ity religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions 
that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because 
unfamiliar."212 
Shortly after Goldman was decided, the Court was faced with an-
other claim for a free exercise exemption from a generally applicable 
regulation. Unlike in Goldman, however, the regulation involved in 
Bowen v. Roy 213 was not constitutive of a community. It concerned, 
instead, the ultimate symbol of the bureaucratic state, the social secur-
ity number that citizens are required to possess and present in order to 
be eligible for certain welfare benefits. The perceived need to avoid 
unduly burdening the operation of government seemed to induce the 
majority in Roy to deny an exemption to Native American parents 
who claimed that assigning a social security number to their infant 
daughter would violate their religious beliefs by "robbing her spirit" of 
the ability to attain greater spiritual power.214 Chief Justice Burger, in 
one of his last opinions for the Court, expressed the concern that, 
210. 475 U.S. at 528-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Congress apparently agreed, for soon 
after Goldman was decided, the United States Code was amended to provide a limited free exer-
cise exemption from military dress requirements, reserving, however, a generous measure of dis· 
cretion to the Secretary: 
[A] member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the 
uniform of the member's armed force [except] (1) [where] the Secretary determines that the 
wearing of the item would interfere with the performance of the member's military duties; or 
(2) if the Secretary determines ... that the item of apparel is not neat and conservative. 
10 U.S.C.A. § 774 (West Supp. 1991). 
211. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
212. 475 U.S. at 524. 
213. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
214. 476 U.S. at 696. 
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given the diversity of America's religions and the pervasiveness of 
modem government, "virtually every action that the Government 
takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is potentially suscep-
tible to a Free Exercise objection."215 Given "the necessity of provid-
ing governments with sufficient operating latitude," he concluded, 
"some incidental neutral restraints on the free exercise of religion are 
inescapable."216 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part, emphasized, as 
she had in Goldman, that an important constitutional right was at 
stake for the plaintiffs. This time, the government's bare assertion of 
"administrative efficiency" was on the other side of the scales.217 
Bowen v. Roy was followed by a succession of cases where, as in 
Roy, free exercise claims were in conflict with regulatory interests of 
government. In these, the Court continued to defer to the judgment of 
public institutions without inquiring deeply into the rationality· or ne-
cessity of the governmental interest involved, or the severity of. the 
burden on individual, associational, or institutional free exercise. In 
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 218 the Court denied a group of Muslims' 
claim for an exemption from generally applicable prison work require-
ments. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion, 219 the Court held the government did not need to show a 
compelling interest to justify the "incidental" burden on religion re-
sulting from public logging and construction activities in a part of Na-
tional Forest land Native American groups had traditionally used for 
religious purposes. Institutional free exercise claims fell before the 
taxing power in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 220 where the Court de-
ferred to the decision of the Internal Revenue Service to deny a chari-
table deduction for certain payments made to the Church of 
Scientology by its members; and in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. 
Board of Equalization, 221 which upheld the imposition of state sales 
taxes on the dissemination of religious material. In Tony and Susan 
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Court held that a non-
profit religious organization was not exempt from the minimum wage 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.222 
These rulings culminated in an explicit abandonment of strict scru-
215. 476 U.S. at 707 n.17. 
216. 476 U.S. at 712. 
217. 476 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
218. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
219. 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 187-94. 
220. 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
221. 110 S. Ct 688 (1990). 
222. 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
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tiny for many types of free exercise cases in Employment Division v. 
Smith, 223 a case involving the denial of unemployment compensation 
to two employees of a drug rehabilitation center who had been fired 
from their jobs for using peyote in violation of their employer's sub-
stance abuse policy and of Oregon criminal law. Though the peyote 
use had been off duty in connection with a Native American religious 
ceremony, the state declared the men ineligible for benefits under the 
provision of Oregon's unemployment compensation law that disquali-
fies applicants who have been discharged for work-related misconduct. 
The Smith case would have been entirely unremarkable if the 
Supreme Court had disposed of the matter by holding that the state's 
compelling interest in its drug policy outweighed the free exercise 
claims of the discharged employees. However, Justice Scalia's opinion 
for the Court not only held that Oregon might require the peyote users 
to forfeit unemployment benefits, but ruled the "compelling interest" 
standard of Sherbert v. Verner224 to be inapplicable to challenges of 
generally applicable, religion-neutral laws.225 He concluded that any 
accommodation of religious practices by means of an exemption from 
a generally applicable law must be provided through the political pro-
cess, noting that Congress and a large number of states had in fact 
exempted sacramental peyote use from criminal penalties.226 
Though Justice O'Connor concurred in the result (which she con-
sidered supported by Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug policy), 
she took strong issue with the majority's abandonment of the compel-
ling interest standard. As in Goldman and Roy, she insisted that vir-
tual abandonment of scrutiny is inappropriate when a constitutional 
right is at stake.227 The disagreement between Justices O'Connor and 
Scalia on the proper standard of review brings into sharp focus the 
current division on the Court over free exercise issues. Justice 
O'Connor's point that the protection of free exercise cannot constitu-
tionally be left entirely to the political process is a powerful one, but so 
is Justice Scalia's point that generally applicable laws with an inciden-
tal effect on religious exercise cannot be deemed presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
223. 110 s. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
224. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra text accompanying notes 71-84. 
225. 110 S. Ct. at 1603, 1604 n.3. 
226. 110 S. Ct. at 1606. One year after Smith was decided, the Oregon legislature exempted 
from criminal penalties the use of peyote in connection with "good faith practice of a religious 
belief." Since the two men involved in Smith had used peyote as guests at a religious ceremony, 
this exemption for people practicing the religion may not have applied to them. Oregon Peyote 
Law Leaves 1983 Defendant Unvindicated, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at A14. 
227. 110 S. Ct. at 1610-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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Each Justice has recognized the validity of the other's argument. 
As O'Connor acknowledged in Lyng, "[G]overnment simply could not 
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and 
desires."228 And as Scalia conceded in his dissent in Texas Monthly v. 
Bullock, the Court cannot simply accept at face value a state's evalua-
tion of the respective worth of its own regulatory objectives versus a 
claimant's interest in exercising his or her religion free of state inter-
ference. 229 What Smith brings out into the open is the degree to which 
the Court in prior cases had finessed free exercise problems by paying 
lip service to a compelling interest test, while in fact according a lower 
level of scrutiny to asserted governmental interests.230 
A principled, intermediate balancing approach to free exercise 
seems indicated. But what has blocked the development of a consen-
sus on some such approach is the same problem that is responsible for 
the disarray of establishment law: the lack of a clear judicial sense of 
the purpose and meaning of the Constitution's religion language. Un-
til the Court squarely faces and reaches an operating consensus on 
those issues, balancing will be but another name for the more or less 
arbitrary exercise of discretion, and outcomes of important cases will 
continue to depend on mere majority vote. 
The experiences of other liberal pluralistic democracies suggest 
that the development of a principled balancing test in the free exercise 
area is not an impossible task, and that the difficulties of administering 
it would be no greater than those involved with other constitutional 
rights.231 This not to say that Justice Scalia's concerns about releasing 
a flood of religion-based litigation are unfounded, nor that he errs in 
regarding bright-line rules as useful litigation-avoidance devices. The 
difficulties that Scalia anticipates, however, derive in large part from 
weaknesses of the American civil litigation system. There is no doubt 
that it is more difficult to discourage frivolous claims in the United 
States than in countries where court procedures, and rules on costs 
and fees, are more effectively deployed toward that end. But responsi-
228. 485 U.S. at 452. 
229. 489 U.S. l, 29-45 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
230. In Smith, Justice Scalia observes, "Although we have sometimes purported to apply the 
Sherbert [compelling interest] test in contexts other than [unemployment compensation], we have 
always found the test satisfied .... " 110 S. Ct. at 1602; see also McConnell, supra note 152, at 
1127 ("[T]he Supreme Court before Smith did not really apply a genuine 'compelling interest' 
test. ... Even the Justices committed to the doctrine of free exercise exemptions have in fact 
applied a far more relaxed standard to these cases . . . . The 'compelling interest' standard is a 
misnomer."). 
231. See, for example, the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany col-
lected in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 444-503 (1989). 
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bility for these shortcomings of our legal system should not be taxed 
against the exercise of a fundamental freedom. 
Meanwhile, on the establishment front, the Court has also been 
adopting a more deferential posture. A glimmer of a possible shift in 
that direction appeared as early as 1983, when the Court by a five-to-
four majority in Mueller v. Allen upheld a Minnesota law permitting 
parents to take a state tax deduction for certain educational expenses 
incurred in sending their children to parochial schools.232 Committee 
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, which in 1973 had 
invalidated a state law providing public funds for repair of private 
school buildings and a form of tuition grant to parents of private 
school children,233 was distinguished. The Court made a somewhat 
more decisive move toward increasing its deference to legislative judg-
ments in 1988 in Bowen v. Kendrick, 234 where it upheld a federal pro-
gram that provided grants to public and private entities (expressly 
including religious organizations) for services and research related to 
teenage sexuality and pregnancy. The Adolescent Family Life Act 
(AFLA), passed by Congress in 1981 in response to the" 'severe ad-
verse health, social, and economic consequences' that often follow 
pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adolescents,"235 provided 
for grants "to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies 'for 
services and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual rela-
tions and pregnancy.' "236 Grants under the Act were intended to 
serve several purposes, including the promotion of self-discipline 
among adolescents, the encouragement of adoption, the development 
of new approaches to the delivery of care and services for pregnant 
adolescents, and the support of basic research into the problems asso-
ciated with adolescent pregnancy.231 
Among the services that could be funded under AFLA were preg-
nancy testing, maternity and adoption counseling, referral services, 
prenatal and postnatal health care, provision of nutritional informa-
tion, child care, mental health services, and educational programs re-
lating to family life and problems associated with adolescent 
premarital sexual relations. But Congress placed certain restrictions 
on the grant money: no funds were to go to demonstration projects for 
family planning services (unless such services were not othenvise 
232. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
233. 413 U.S. 756 (1973); see supra text accompanying note 130. 
234. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
235. 487 U.S. at 593 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1986)). 
236. 487 U.S. at 593 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981)). 
237. 487 U.S. at 593-4; 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(l)-(4) (1988). 
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available in the community), to groups that provide abortions or abor-
tion counseling, or to groups that advocate, promote, or encourage 
abortions. 
The controversy these restrictions generated unfortunately eclipsed 
the fact that the AFLA represented a serious and important congres-
sional experiment with an alternative method of delivering much-
needed social services. The Senate committee report on the bill had 
frankly acknowledged "the limitations of Government in dealing with 
a problem that has complex moral and social dimensions," and stated 
the committee's belief that "promoting the involvement of religious 
organizations in the solution to these problems is neither inappropriate 
or illegal."238 The thought was, apparently, that the use of nongovern-
mental structures might help provide social services in a less costly 
and more effective way than the public sector had been able to accom-
plish. The AFLA consequently provided that federally funded serv-
ices in this area should promote the involvement of parents of the 
affected children and should "emphasize the provision of support by 
other family members, religious and charitable organizations, volun-
tary associations, and other groups."239 The effort to secure broad-
based involvement of nongovernmental groups was intended by Con-
gress to " 'establish better coordination, integration, and linkages' 
among existing programs in the community, ... to aid in the develop-
ment of 'strong family values and close family ties' and to 'help adoles-
cents and their families deal with complex issues of adolescent 
premarital sexual relations and the consequences of such 
relations.' "240 
Controversy over the family planning provisions, coupled with the 
fact that a number of AFLA grant recipients had institutional ties to 
religious denominations, resulted in a legal challenge to the program 
as violating the Establishment Clause doctrine formulated in Lemon. 
When that lawsuit came before the Court in 1988, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist examined the constitutionality of AFLA under the Lemon test. 
He found that the first prong of the test, the requirement of a secular 
purpose, was satisfied because the AFLA was aimed at the elimination 
or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexu-
ality, pregnancy, and parenthood. This purpose was not rendered im-
permissible because it coincided in some respects with the beliefs of 
certain religious organizations. The inclusion of religious organiza-
238. 487 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, supra note 236, at 15-16). 
239. 487 U.S. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(lO)(C) (1982)). 
240. 487 U.S. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(lO)(A), (a)(lO)(C), (b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986)). 
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tions among the grantees to help achieve these goals also had a secular 
purpose, namely, to "improve the effectiveness of the Act's pro-
grams. "241 On this point, the Court cited the testimony of a witness 
before the Senate Committee to the effect that " 'projects which target 
hispanic and other minority populations are more accepted by the 
population if they include sectarian, as well as non-sectarian, organiza-
tions in the delivery of those services.' "242 As Mark Chopko has ob-
served, "The goal of serving a genuinely pluralistic community is not 
achieved by uniform delivery of services by only one type of 
provider. "243 
The Constitution does not rule out such diversified approaches, ac-
cording to Rehnquist. The Establishment Clause, he wrote, did not 
prohibit Congress from recognizing the 
important part that religion or religious organizations may play in 
resolving certain secular problems .... [I]t seems quite sensible for Con-
gress to recognize that religious organizations can influence values and 
can have some influence on family life, including parents' relations with 
their adolescent children . 
. . . The propriety of this holding, and the long history of cooperation 
and interdependence between governments and charitable or religious 
organizations is reflected in the legislative history of the AFLA. 244 
The controversy surrounding the AFLA's inclusion of religious 
groups among grantees illustrates the dramatic shift in the role of reli-
gion in American society that has occurred since the Bill of Rights was 
adopted. For Americans in the eighteenth century, and "indeed for 
generations thereafter, free exercise of religion included freedom of 
religious groups to take an active part in regulating family responsibili-
ties, education, health care, poor relief, and various other aspects of 
social life that were considered to have a significant moral dimen-
sion."245 Gradually, the state has taken over many of the functions 
formerly left to religious communities, achieving control over the pro-
241. 487 U.S. at 605 n.10. 
242. 487 U.S. at 2572 n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 496, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984)); see also 
Susan Chira, Black Churches Renew A Mission: Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at Al. 
243. Mark E. Chopko,lntentional Values and the Public Interest-A Plea/or Consistency in 
Church/State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1143, 1179 (1990). 
244. Kendrick. 487 U.S. at 607, 609. Though the Court held the statute was not facially 
invalid, Kendrick did not eliminate the chilling effect of Lemon on legislative experimentation 
with cooperative arrangements with religious organizations. The case was remanded to the dis-
trict court for continued litigation concerning whether any of the grants made pursuant to the 
statute were actually being administered in a way that violated the Lemon bans on advancing 
religion or excessive entanglement. 487 U.S. at 622. 
245. Harold I. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State, in ARTI· 
CLES OF FAITH, supra note 120, at 42. 
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vision of most primary and secondary education in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and increasing its presence in the social service area as the 
American version of the welfare state developed in the twentieth. 
Now that welfare states all over the world seem to be sensing the 
limits of their ability to provide social services through public agen-
cies, many governments are exploring partnerships with private orga-
nizations, including religious groups. Religious organizations, 
traditional providers of social services, especially in the areas of educa-
tion and health care, will be important resources for societies endeav-
oring to reach the largest numbers of needy citizens in the most 
efficient, effective, and humane ways possible. When we forbid such 
joint efforts, "[n]ot only are we substantially deprived of the option of 
enlisting church-related social service institutions (a large and richly 
experienced institutional sector) in implementing public programs, but 
their exclusion often makes it difficult for government to act through 
private sector institutions at all," because politicians are loath to ap-
pear to be discriminating against their religious constituents. 246 
Under the strict separationist approach favored by what was by 
then a group of dissenters in Kendrick, the participation of religious 
groups in creative new approaches to homelessness, child care, and 
care for victims of AIDS and other disabling illnesses would be 
sharply restricted. Though Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens, agreed that the AFLA had a legitimate 
secular purpose, he argued that it violated the Lemon test by advanc-
ing religion. "Whereas there may be secular values promoted by the 
AFLA," Justice Blackmun wrote, "including the encouragement of 
adoption and premarital chastity and the discouragement of abortion, 
it can hardly be doubted that when promoted in theological terms by 
religious figures, those values take on a religious nature."247 
Moreover, Blackmun speculated, statutes like the AFLA might ac-
tually pose a threat to participating religious groups. By enlisting 
their aid in carrying out social programs while subjecting them to 
First Amendment restrictions, he warned, 
we risk secularizing and demeaning the sacred enterprise. Whereas there 
is undoubtedly a role for churches of all denominations in helping pre-
vent the problems often associated with early sexual activity and unplan-
ned pregnancies, any attempt to confine that role within the strictures of 
a government-sponsored secular program, can only taint the religious 
mission with a "corrosive secularism."248 
246. MORGAN, supra note 27, at 41. 
247. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 639 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting). 
248. 487 U.S. at 640 n.10 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 
(1985)). 
528 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:477 
The "strictures" to which Blackmun refers, of course, were im-
posed not by the First Amendment, but by the Lemon test and its 
predecessors. Kendrick demonstrated, however, that a majority of the 
Court was increasingly uneasy with Lemon's rigid categories. 
But, as a case decided the following year plainly revealed, the Jus-
tices who were dissatisfied with Lemon were far from united on what 
to do about it. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, a group of plaintiffs had brought an action challenging, on es-
tablishment grounds, the display of a nativity scene and a menorah on 
public property during the December holiday season.249 The plurality 
opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, held that the display of the 
creche violated Lemon's prohibition against advancing religion, while 
the display of the menorah next to a Christmas tree in another loca-
tion did not. 250 Like other symbol cases, the Allegheny decision seems 
to us to be more interesting for the light it sheds on the assumptions 
under which the Justices were operating than for its result. 
Justice O'Connor concluded that the results were justifiable on the 
basis of "careful line drawing" under the unique circumstances of each 
case, but she warned that the Court must avoid "drawing lines which 
entirely sweep away all government recognition and acknowledgment 
of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens for to do so would 
exhibit not neutrality but hostility to religion."251 She took the occa-
sion to advance again the substitute for the Lemon test that she had 
formulated and proposed in an earlier case involving a Christmas dis-
play, Lynch v. Donnelly. 252 The proper way to approach establishment 
cases, she suggested, was to review each challenged governmental 
practice "in its unique circumstances to determine whether it consti-
tutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion."253 This endorsement 
test, she explained, rested on the recognition that Court decisions re-
garding matters of great moment send "messages" to the public at 
large. The proposed test, she argued, "captures the essential com-
mand of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not 
make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the 
political community by conveying a message 'that religion or a partic-
ular religious belief is favored or preferred.' " 254 
249. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
250. 492 U.S. at 621. 
251. 492 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (citation 
omitted). 
252. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
253. 492 U.S. at 625. 
254. 492 U.S. at 627 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con· 
curring in the judgment)). 
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Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Scalia and White, concurred in the holding that there was 
no Establishment Clause violation in the case of the menorah, but dis-
sented from the holding that the creche display advanced religion. 
The much-criticized Lemon test, he argued, accorded too little latitude 
for recognizing the central role of religion in society to serve as the 
Court's primary guide for resolving establishment cases. Like Justice 
O'Connor, he was concerned about the message the Court's religion 
decisions were sending. But wher~s she concentrated primarily on 
the dangers of an exclusionary message to nonadherents, his attention 
was fixed mainly on the undesirability of a message of hostility to reli-
gion. Two limiting principles, Justice Kennedy suggested, were avail-
able in the Court's precedents to prevent legitimate accommodation of 
religion from becoming illegitimate establishment: 
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility 
or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree 
that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to 
do so."255 
The old, strict, separationist view was maintained in Allegheny by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, all of whom joined in opinions 
written by Brennan and Stevens, concurring in the Court's decision to 
bar the creche and dissenting from, the decision to permit display of 
the menorah. 256 
The next year, the fragmented Lemon critics in Allegheny joined in 
an opinion upholding against an establishment challenge the applica-
tion of the federal Equal Access Act to require a high school to extend 
the same privilege to a student religious group to meet on school 
premises after hours as it had extended to nonreligious student groups 
and clubs. 257 
As matters stood in the fall of 1991, six members of the high court 
were on record as dissatisfied with Lemon v. Kurtzman's separationist 
test for determining whether the establishment provision had been vio-
lated. 258 The Court seemed on the verge of replacing Lemon, either 
255. 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
256. 492 U.S. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
257. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). 
258. For Justices Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White, see Allegheny, 492 U.S. 
at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice David 
Souter, when asked in his confirmation hearings about his view of the Court's approach to 
church-state issues, commented, "The concerns that have been raised about [the Lemon test] 
naturally provoke a search, not only perhaps for a different test of the standard which we think 
we are applying today, but a deeper re-examination about the very concept behind the establish-
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with the deferential standard proposed by Justice Kennedy, under 
which government would be forbidden only to coerce or proselytize, 
or with the modified separationist test proposed by Justice O'Connor, 
under which government would be barred from "endorsing" reli-
gion. 259 Together with the retreat from the compelling interest test in 
cases involving requests for exemptions from generally applicable 
laws, the adoption of the Kennedy, or even the O'Connor, standard 
would move the Court closer to a unified, across-the-board deferential 
approach in church-state matters. 
A new posture of deference would have certain virtues. It would 
be more respectful of the significant regional cultural variations that 
exist in this country, of local control, and of democratic political 
processes. It would relieve the courts, to a great extent, from having 
to make decisions on such perplexing issues as the definition of a reli-
gion, the sincerity of a person's religious belief, and the relative weight 
of governmental interests and burdens on religious belief and practice. 
It would facilitate governmental utilization of mediating structures to 
help deliver a variety of badly needed social services. In so doing, it 
might help to promote important forms of free exercise, especially by 
permitting legislatures to help parents regain a measure of control over 
their children's moral and educational development. That so much 
attention and energy have been expended on litigation over prayer in 
the public schools is symptomatic, we believe, of displaced concern 
about a deeper issue: the growing sense of many parents that they do 
not have a meaningful say in their children's education.260 
Ultimately, however, simply adopting a more deferential test will 
not promote a better understanding of how the free exercise and estab-
lishment portions of the Religion Clause should interact to protect 
religious freedom. A mechanically applied deferential approach could 
ment clause." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Take Fresh Look at Disputed Church·State 
Boundary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at Al6. 
259. More compatible with the structural method advocated here would be an approach that 
would take as its starting point the positive liberty created by the First Amendment's religious 
freedom guarantee and the governmental obligations flowing therefrom. The protection of reli-
gious freedom would seem to require liberty-enhancing governmental accommodation, but not 
sponsorship, of religious expression. For an attempt (pre-Allegheny) to work out the appropriate 
scope and limits of an evenhanded accommodationist approach aimed at promoting religious 
pluralism as a public value while protecting individual and institutional religious freedom from 
governmental interference, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. 
Cr. REv. 1. In a later article, McConnell wrote: "The Court should not ask, 'Will this advance 
religion?,' but rather, 'Will this advance pluralism?' The Court should not ask, 'Will this be 
religiously divisive?,' but rather, 'Will this tend to suppress expression of religious differences?' " 
McConnell, supra note 24, at 1516. 
260. See Parents Support Choice For Schools, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at DIS; 
see also Ellen Goodman, Parents Overwhelmed by the Culture, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1991, at 
C9, and infra Part IV. 
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be subversive of individual, associational, and institutional free exer-
cise, especially where small, unconventional, or unpopular religions 
are concerned. As Justice Scalia bluntly acknowledged in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, "leaving accommodation to the political pro-
cess will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that 
are not widely engaged in .... "261 Indeed, near-automatic deference 
to the elected branches would pose a menace to free exercise by mem-
bers of America's diverse assortment of larger religious groups as well. 
For the emerging deferential approach raises doubts about the extent 
to which the Court will continue to accord constitutional scrutiny to 
governmental use of taxing and regulatory powers to infringe on reli-
gious organizations. If Smith does, as many fear, represent the 
Court's adoption of a reflexive, mechanical form of deference, the re-
sults could be as inimical to religious freedom as they were under the 
old separationist approaches. 262 
Neither rigid separationism nor mechanical deference comports 
with the language and history of the Constitution, for as Justice 
O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Smith, the First 
Amendment requires positive protection for the religious liberty of 
Americans. "[T]he First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom 
of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of 
speech, a 'constitutional nor[m],'" a "preferred" right, singled out by 
the Framers for "special protections."263 
In our view, however, Smith does not necessarily portend a defini-
tive move to a rigid and mechanical posture of deference. In the first 
place, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court does not purport to repre-
sent a comprehensive reordering of a body of law that took over forty 
years to become unprincipled and unworkable. Second, the bare result 
of the case, amply justified by Oregon's drug enforcement policy, is 
scarcely an innovation. And third, the Smith opinion itself acknowl-
edges the continuing need for careful scrutiny in certain types of cases. 
The principal problem with Smith - as with Bowen v. Roy, 
261. 110 s. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990). 
262. Michael McConnell has compiled an admonitory list of examples of the inroads into 
religious freedom that might result if the Court adopts a reflexive deferential approach: orthodox 
Jews could be required to end sexual segregation in their places of worship; Catholic doctors in 
public hospitals could be fired for refusing to perform abortions; public school students might be 
forced to attend sex education classes contrary to their faith; orthodox Jewish athletes might be 
excluded from sports teams unless they relinquished their religious head covering; prisons would 
not be required to respect the dietary laws binding Jewish or Muslim prisoners; the Catholic 
church might be required to hire female priests; and historic preservation laws might be used to 
prevent churches from making theologically significant alterations to their structures. McCon-
nell, supra note 152, at 1142-43. 
263. 110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting McConnell, supra note 259, at 9). 
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O'Lone v. Estate of Shahbaz, Hernandez v. Commissioner, and Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization - is the current major-
ity's readiness to accept unsupported government assertions about the 
nature and strength of its interests, without reckoning the likely bur-
dens in each case on free exercise.264 As Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy have rightly emphasized, the Court's religion decisions not only 
resolve disputes brought before the Court but also send "messages" to 
the public and to the other branches of govemment.265 Smith, in its 
broadest implications, would cancel the wholesome message of earlier 
free exercise decisions to legislators, administrators, local officials, 
school boards, and the like that the Constitution requires government 
to accommodate religious practices where it can do so without seri-
ously burdening governmental interests. As Michael McConnell has 
pointed out, "[m]any, if not most, of the accommodations found in 
state and federal statutes were enacted in response to the argument 
that they were constitutionally required."266 
We consider it unlikely that the broadest statements in Smith will 
be taken to their limits by the current majority. Keeping in mind that 
it required decades for the law in the church-state area to arrive at its 
present tangled condition, it seems reasonable to expect a few fits, and 
even false starts, as the Court strives to work out a better way of deal-
ing with the sensitive and immensely complex issues involved in these 
cases. It is possible, of course, that the Rehnquist Court, like previous 
Courts, will, without much deliberation, brush the freedom of religion 
aside while it pursues an unrelated constitutional agenda. Smith may, 
as some fear, be the decisive step toward a reflexive majoritarianism as 
insensitive to the concerns of "incorrigibly religious" Americans as 
was the antimajoritarianism of the rights revolution. But a more plau-
sible trajectory is that Smith in time will come to be seen as mainly 
explicable in relation to a strong national policy relating to a severe 
national problem. That is, just as Bob Jones is more of an antidis-
crimination case than a Religion Clause case, so Smith may tum out 
to be primarily a drug case - a step, rather than a landmark, in the 
process of rationalizing and reconstructing Religion Clause case law. 
The current Court's dissatisfaction with the old strict separationist 
approach and its more recent, weaker versions presents the Court with 
an opportunity to reconstruct its Religion Clause jurisprudence. Hav-
ing cleared away the barriers imposed by the "wall of separation," the 
264. See supra notes 220-31 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text. 
266. Michael McConnell, The Amazing, Disappearing, Free Exercise Clause (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the authors). 
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Court can begin to knit together the severed halves of the Religion 
Clause, orienting both toward the service of religious freedom. The 
demise of the rigorously separationist approach may release "free ex-
ercise" from its narrow interpretation and from its long subordination 
to a broad construction of "establishment." If the Court were to begin 
to restore both parts of the Religion Clause to the service of freedom 
of religion, the problem of developing principled limits on free exercise 
would become more susceptible of reasoned resolution. For it would 
be seen not as governed by the extra-constitutional principle of separa-
tionism, but as involving the interplay of free exercise with other con-
stitutional values, of varying weights under the circumstances of 
actual cases. 267 
The new posture of deference, it seems to us, is the first stage of a 
gradual transition to a flexible but principled approach that will treat 
the Religion Clause as a whole. The foundations of such a reconstruc-
tion of Religion Clause law are already present in various decisions, 
dissents, and concurrences authored by members of the Smith major-
ity. Prominent among the elements that can be expected to promote 
the development of a more principled and workable body of Religion 
Clause law are Chief Justice Rehnquist's careful attention to history in 
Wallace v. Jajfree, 268 his often-expressed solicitude for the role of reli-
gion as a mediating structure,269 and his Hamiltonian respect for fed-
eralism and the separation of powers. Justice O'Connor has displayed 
a serious concern with the religion issues as they bear on the lives of 
citizens,270 solicitude for all points of view,271 a prudent inclination to 
proceed cautiously case by case,272 and a persistence in demanding fac-
tual and legal justification. 273 These traits will be essential to bringing 
267. See infra Part IV. 
268. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text; infra notes 298-306 
and accompanying text. 
269. See infra notes 28~-96 and accompanying text. 
270. For example: 
Judicial review of government action under the Establishment Clause is a delicate task. The 
Court has avoided drawing lines which entirely sweep away all government recognition and 
acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens for to do so would exhibit 
not neutrality but hostility to religion. 
Allegheny County v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
in the judgment). 
271. E.g., "There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in each of these sugges-
tions .... " Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 79 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(referring to critiques of existing establishment tests). 
272. For example, her discussion of the need for careful line-drawing in Allegheny, 492 U.S. 
at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
273. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning assertion that public school teachers tutoring on premises of religious schools will neces-
sarily inculcate religion). 
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the rich resources of traditional common law judging to bear on 
problems to which the Court in the past has given short shrift.274 An-
other likely important factor is Justice Kennedy's constant alertness to 
the ways that purported neutrality can mask hostility to religion, a 
concern that in many cases cannot be alleviated without some scrutiny 
of the purposes and effects of laws that appear to be neutral on their 
face.275 Finally, Justice Scalia's fresh reading in Smith of the free-ex-
ercise decisions may have opened the way to a more holistic approach 
of the type that we advocate here. After Smith, it seems more likely 
that future Religion Clause cases will continue to be resolved in the 
light of the interplay among various constitutional values. 
Justice O'Connor best summed up the current state of affairs in a 
speech on the bicentennial of the Religion Clause in the spring of 
1991. The Court, she said, was "at a crossroads," with existing doc-
trine "quite fragile" and with the members of the Court "narrowly 
and deeply divided."276 The only certainty was that debate among the 
members of the Court would continue and that the problems would 
not be susceptible of easy resolution. We find her sober assessment 
encouraging, for it suggests that the current Court may be prepared to 
accord the Religion Clause the serious attention it has long merited 
and seldom received.211 
IV. STRUCTURAL FREE EXERCISE 
With hindsight, the innocent catalyst for the train of events that 
brought Religion Clause jurisprudence to its present tangled state 
seems to have been the piecemeal approach to incorporation. The pro-
cess of reviewing the various parts of the Bill of Rights separately, at 
intervals, set the stage for interpreting the establishment and free exer-
cise provisions as embodying independent sets of ideas, thus obscuring 
their common purpose. An earnest struggle at the time of incorpora-
tion with the special interpretive difficulties that incorporation 
presented in the religion area would in all probability have averted 
274. Justice Souter, like Justice O'Connor, was an experienced state court judge before join· 
ing the Court. As of May 1991, his voting pattern resembled that of Justice O'Connor more 
closely than that of any other Justice. Linda Greenhouse, Another Frantic Finish Loams far High 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1991, at A20. 
275. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 
110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). 
276. Reported in Rob Boston, Religious Liberty at the Crossroads, CHURCH & STATE, July· 
Aug. 1991, at 4, 5. 
277. The Court heard oral argument in Lee v. Weisman, a challenge to the constitutionality 
of prayers at public school graduation ceremonies, on November 6, 1991. See Linda Green· 
house, Justices Appear Wary in Argument Over Prayer at Schaal Graduations, N.Y. TIMES, No· 
vember 7, 1991, at A14. 
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many subsequent missteps. But the Court's early resort to the simplis-
tic "wall" metaphor ensconced separationism as an end in itself, 
thereby driving a wedge between the free exercise and establishment 
provisions and creating the appearance of tension between them. The 
two-clause approach in tum produced two largely separate bodies of 
case law. Moreover, the adoption of bright-line tests for establishment 
cases and balancing tests for free exercise meant that the classification 
of a dispute as a free exercise or establishment case was often determi-
native of its outcome. 278 Over time, court majorities gave a narrow 
construction to free exercise, neglecting its associational and institu-
tional aspects. These important dimensions of religious freedom fur-
ther suffered from the Court's broad construction of the First 
Amendment's establishment language. The effect was to regularly 
subordinate the free exercise of religion to the policy of enforcing a 
rigid separation of church and state. In case after case, as we have 
seen, the First Amendment was thus turned on its head. 
Ordinarily, a question of c_onstitutional interpretation of such diffi-
culty and import would galvanize the legal academy. Constitutional 
law scholars, however, for the most part have uncritically accepted the 
Court's ahistorical approach. With a few notable exceptions,279 they, 
too, have tended to treat nonestablishment as the basic end to which 
some derogation might cautiously be allowed in order to accommo-
date the free exercise of religion. Laurence Tribe, for example, in his 
widely used treatise, describes the free exercise provision as "carv[ing] 
out" a "zone" where "permissible accommodation" of religious inter-
ests may take place.280 
From time to time, the advance of the separationist position was 
interrupted, as we have seen, when Court majorities drew back from 
taking it to its furthest logical extremes.281 Various explanations have 
been advanced for these occasional aberrations: Justice Douglas' am-
bitions for the presidency for a brief period in the 1950s;282 Justice 
278. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1609-10, 1723 n.101 (1987). 
279. See especially McConneU, supra note 24; NOONAN, supra note 11. 
280. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1169. 
281. Walz v. Tax Commn. of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding against establish-
ment challenge a statute granting tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious proper-
ties used solely for religious purposes as part of a larger scheme of exemptions for property used 
exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 
236 (1968) (upholding against establishment challenge a state law requiring local public sch6ol 
authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to a11 students in grades 7-12, including those in 
private religious schools); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding against establish-
ment challenge a statute which required the release, at parents' request, of public school students 
during the school day to attend religion classes); see also supra notes 107-21 and accompanying 
text (discussing Walz). 
282. In 1952, Douglas maintained that the Constitution was never meant to require equal 
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Brennan's concern for the associational rights of selected minority 
groups during his long tenure on the bench; and what Mark Tushnet 
has called a "marginality principle" permitting the free exercise of reli-
gion when the issue at stake seemed harmless or unimportant to secu-
lar-minded judges.283 Occasionally, as when the Court upheld the 
traditional tax exemption for church property in Walz, the Justices 
seemed to realize that the logic of extreme separationism was pro-
foundly threatening to the religious liberty of millions of Americans. 
These sporadic departures from separationism prompted friends and 
foes of the principle to castigate the Court for inconsistency.284 In 
retrospect, however, as we have shown, the Court was fairly consistent 
for some forty years in pursuing an individualistic, secularist, and sep-
arationist approach to religion cases. 
A majority of the members of the current Court now appear to 
have concluded that the Religion Clause jurisprudence of the past fifty 
years is seriously flawed. They are far from unanimous, however, on 
their diagnosis of the problems, or on their idea of the appropriate 
remedies. A loose coalition on the current Court has come perilously 
close to disposing of the difficulties in the area by throwing the First 
Amendment's religious freedom guarantee out with the bathwater of 
forty years of separationist case law. 285 Their emerging deferential ap-
proach could, in effect, "unincorporate" the religion language of the 
First Amendment. This, it seems to us, would be a regrettable out-
come. For the effect would be to send a message that religious free-
dom is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,''286 and that the 
freedom the Framers placed first in the Bill of Rights is not entitled to 
a prominent place on the twentieth century's "honor roll of superior 
rights."287 
As we have argued, however, that is not the inevitable trajectory of 
the current Court's reconsideration of a body of law that took many 
decades to reach its present unworkable state. Discernible in the opin-
ions of a majority of the current Justices are the elements of a new 
approach that we call structural free exercise. We use the word struc-
treatment for nonbelievers, and he espoused a view of free exercise that encompassed each reli· 
gious organization's freedom to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of 
its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). In the 1970s, however, he warned 
against augmenting the power of "organized religion" in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part), and "religious organizations" in Walz v. Tax Commn. of 
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 700 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
283. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 723. 
284. See sources cited supra note 9. 
285. See supra text accompanying notes 199-231, 261-66. 
286. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
287. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 74. 
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tural in an organic, rather than a mechanical, sense to refer to the 
relations within and among texts, and between legal and social institu-
tions. The structural approach situates the religion language within its 
historical and literary context. It takes into consideration the institu-
tional and associational, as well as the individual, aspects of religious 
freedom. It is informed by an awareness of the role of America's reli-
gions in the cultural foundations of the democratic experiment. 
Much of the theoretical groundwork for a structural approach to 
the Religion Clause can be found in various writings of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. In 1978, then-Justice Rehnquist gave the keynote address 
of a University of Miami Law School lecture series on the topic "The 
Adversary Society."288 In that speech he chose to stress the crucial 
roles that nongovernmental institutions play in our society. He ex-
pressed concern about the pressure on the courts from ideological liti-
gants to resolve controversies that previously had been left largely to 
regulation by other social and political institutions. Noting the disrup-
tive effect that adversarial proceedings can have on ongoing social re-
lations and structures, he suggested that protection of such relations 
and structures ought to be one factor in policymakers' evaluation of 
the desirability of alternative methods of dispute resolution. 
As an example of an appropriate sensitivity to the need to protect 
the internal autonomy of social structures from governmental interfer-
ence, he cited the Supreme Court's 1976 refusal, in Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 289 to overturn the decision of an ec-
clesiastical tribunal regarding a property dispute between two factions 
of a church. In a democracy, Justice Rehnquist explained, it is some-
times necessary to reject certain claims of individuals, and to attach 
"special weight" to institutions, like unions, churches, and other com-
munities of memory and mutual aid. "While this should not confer 
upon them ... a power to ride roughshod over the claims of individu-
als," he said, occasional deference to such institutions is justified in 
situations where "adversary litigation of the propriety of [internal] de-
cisions would have more disadvantageous consequences in terms of 
diminishing the usefulness of the institution than would the ultimate 
resolution by the court of the claim of individual right."290 At the 
conclusion of his lecture, he reflected, "Those who make our laws ... 
serve us poorly if they do not recognize that the world in which we live 
is an intricate web of relationships between people, private institutions 
288. See William H. Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1978). 
289. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
290. Rehnquist, supra note 288, at 8, 18. 
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and government at its various levels."291 
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist has carried forward the vision of fed-
eralism, the separation of powers, and the institutions of civil society 
outlined in the Miami speech. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 292 he made it 
clear that the Court was not disposed to cooperate with litigants bent 
on using the establishment provision to undermine legislative efforts to 
include religious organizations along with other mediating structures 
in programs designed to attack pressing social problems. The reason 
Congress had expressly mandated the participation of a variety of 
community organizations - religious groups among them - in the 
teenage pregnancy program, he pointed out, was "to spark the devel-
opment of new, innovative services."293 Signaling that ideological 
plaintiffs would in the future find it more difficult to block such experi-
ments, he wrote: "Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress 
from ... recognizing the important part that religion or religious orga-
nizations may play in resolving certain secular problems."294 He 
pointed to the country's "long history of cooperation and interdepen-
dency between governments and charitable or religious organiza-
tions," and to the fact that the provision of social services by 
religiously affiliated charitable groups has long taken place without 
controversy and with community support.295 "This Court," he said, 
"has never held that religious institutions are disabled by the First 
Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare 
programs. "296 
Bowen v. Kendrick thus represented a significant repair of the road 
that had led to Aguilar v. Felton. 291 A thorough reconstruction, how-
ever, would have to begin with the abandonment of the Lemon test, 
and the assumption of the long-neglected task of interpreting the Reli-
gion Clause in the light of its history and purposes. The Chief Justice 
laid down the basis for that essential work in his scholarly dissent in 
Wallace v. Jajfree. 298 Canvassing the history of the provision, includ-
ing the pertinent statements of the Framers, the actual organization of 
church-state relations in the various states at the time the Bill of 
Rights was adopted, and the evidence concerning the way the religion 
291. Id. at 18. 
292. 487 U.S. 589 (1988); see supra notes 234-48 and accompanying text. 
293. 487 U.S. at 604. 
294. 487 U.S. at 607. 
295. 487 U.S. at 609. 
296. 487 U.S. at 609. 
297. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). See supra notes 157-85 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
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language had been understood during the nineteenth century, Rehn-
quist found the record barren of any suggestion that the establishment 
language makes separationism a distinct goal, rather than a means to 
promote religious freedom. The Chief Justice's examination of the 
proceedings of the first Congress leading up to the adoption of the 
First Amendment, the actions of the first and subsequent Congresses 
touching on religious matters, and the writings of leading nineteenth-
century constitutional commentators also confirmed that nothing in 
the establishment provision had been intended to require the govern-
ment to be neutral as between religion and nonreligion.299 All the evi-
dence suggested a "well-accepted meaning" for the establishment 
provision: The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit 
the designation of any "national religion" and "forbade preference 
among religious sects or denominations. "300 
The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality be-
tween religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government 
from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no 
historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to 
build the "wall of separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson. 301 
The Chief Justice went on to concede that a lack of historical basis 
for the "theory of rigid separation"302 would not in itself be a reason 
to begin anew if the theory in operatic:m had yielded a unified and prin-
cipled body of case law. The record of decisions from Everson 303 on-
ward, however, showed that the opposite had been the case. 
"Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical un-
workability, the Everson 'wall' has proved all but useless as a guide to 
sound constitutional adjudication."304 The Lemon 305 test, he contin-
ued, suffered from the same defects as the wall concept. It lacked any 
grounding in the language or purpose of the First Amendment, and it 
had proved incapable of generating adequate standards for the princi-
pled decision of Religion Clause cases. 306 
299. Also concluding that protection of free exercise was not meant to apply to nonreligion 
are Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 
597-604, Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 233, 236 (1989), and McConnell, supra note 24, at 1495. 
300. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
301. 472 U.S. at 106. 
302. 472 U.S. at 106. 
303. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see supra notes 22-45 and accompanying 
text. 
304. 472 U.S. at 107. 
305. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see supra notes 125-29 and accompanying 
text. 
306. 472 U.S. at 110. 
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A. The Religion Language in Context 
Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jajfree prepared the way for the 
Court to undertake the careful interpretive process that should have 
occurred in the 1940s, a process that would commence, in the usual 
way, with a consideration of the textual passage as a whole, in the light 
of its history, purposes, and its relation to other parts of the Bill of 
Rights. When and if the Court proceeds to that step, however, its path 
will not be free of difficulty. Consider the familiar language of the 
First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. "307 
Grammatically, this famous sentence contains no "clauses" at all. 
(A clause, the reader will recall from school days, is a word group 
containing a subject and a predicate, and constituting part of a com-
pound or complex sentence.308) The First Amendment is what gram-
marians call a simple sentence. Its structure contains a subject 
(Congress), a verb (shall make), and an object (law), followed by three 
participial phrases serving as adjectival modifiers that tell us what kind 
of law Congress is forbidden to make. The word clause, of course, has 
an additional meaning. Thus, according to Webster's Second, a clause 
can also be "[a] short sentence, a separate portion of a discourse or 
writing; a distinct article, stipulation, or proviso, in a formal docu-
ment. "309 It is in this sense that lawyers speak of the "clauses" of 
contracts, statutes, pleadings, wills, treaties, and constitutions. And it 
is in this sense that the First Amendment may be said to contain a 
clause, or clauses, pertaining to religion. 
But which is it? Are there two separate propositions - that Con-
gress may not establish a religion and that Congress may not prohibit 
the free exercise of religion? Or is there but one proposition - that 
Congress may not interfere with freedom of religion, either by estab-
lishing a religion or by otherwise prohibiting its free exercise? The 
interpretive problem is not free of difficulty. 
Nor is it entirely clear from the text precisely what sort of activity 
Congress was banned from undertaking in the establishment area. If 
307. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
308. The second edition of Webster's New International Dictionary (1958) defines a "clause," 
in the grammatical sense, as "[a] word group formed by subject and predicate elements but 
constituting a member of a complex or compound sentence instead of ranking as a completed 
sentence." 
309. Id. 
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the intent was solely to prevent the founding of a national religion, 
why does the establishment phrase not simply say so? The broader 
formulation chosen - forbidding Congress to make any law "respect-
ing an establishment of religion" - suggests that the Framers' pur-
pose was not merely to promote freedom of religion by banning a 
national religion, but to insulate and protect the various existing state-
level arrangements from congressional interference.310 The meaning 
of this language, and the puzzle of whether and how to make it appli-
cable against the states, posed formidable problems that the Court in 
the incorporation era simply ignored. 
What light, if any, does the First Amendment context of the reli-
gion language shed on these questions? The First Amendment, read 
as a whole, forbids Congress to interfere with a group of important 
freedoms. The provisions dealing with religious freedom were placed 
first among this group, followed by the familiar protections for speech, 
the press, and the right of the people to assemble and to petition for 
redress of grievances. The structure of the amendment suggests that 
the subject of protection in the first participial phrase is religious free-
dom, just as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition are the 
subjects of protection in the following two phrases. If the two religion 
provisions are read together in the light of an overarching purpose to 
protect freedom of religion, most of the tension between them disap-
pears. They are complementary provisions, both in the service of the 
same fundamental right. They bar Congress from abridging religious 
freedom in one specific way (by legislation "respecting an establish-
ment of religion"), and in general ("or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof"). 
Naturally, these interpretive questions cannot be resolved on the 
basis of First Amendment text and its history alone, for the First 
Amendment itself has a context: the Bill of Rights and the overall 
constitutional design for government.311 When the religion language 
is situated in this larger context, further light is shed on its role within 
the constitutional and social order. 
B. The Religion Clause and the Structure of the Bill of Rights 
The fate of the First Amendment's religion language has been 
closely bound to the development of post-incorporation Bill of Rights 
310. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Amar, supra note 25, at 1157. 
311. As John H. Mansfield has observed, "[T]here is a need for a more encompassing and 
clearer view of both of the religion clauses of the first amendment and also of the relation be-
tween the religion clauses and other provisions of the Constitution." Mansfield, supra note 26 at 
847. 
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interpretation generally. From the mid-1950s onward, this process 
was characterized by the tendency of many judges and legal scholars 
to place selected individual and minority rights at the apex of constitu-
tional values. In an entirely appropriate response to pervasive racism 
in our society, the courts in the period of the rights revolution invoked 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to with-
draw a number of issues from legislative and local control. As time 
went on, however, judicial practices that originated and found their 
justification in the historic struggle to deal with one of the nation's 
most serious social problems were brought into play with regard to an 
expanding variety of political and civil liberties. A large segment of 
the legal community came to regard the entire Bill of Rights as in the 
service of individual and minority rights. 
Akhil Amar points out in a recent article that the judges and schol-
ars who have championed individual and minority rights, regarding 
state and local governments as threats to those rights, have given spe-
cial prominence to one part of our constitutional tradition at the ex-
pense of others.312 What has been obscured and subordinated in this 
process is the older and equally important element of American con-
stitutionalism that was designed to protect majorities ("the people") 
from centralized and sometimes unrepresentative control.313 Since the 
Bill of Rights embodies both traditions in its interlocking parts, it can-
not be read in "discrete chunks" without loss to all Americans.314 
Amar's examination of legal scholarship on the Bill of Rights 
reveals that teachers and writers in the law schools have not presented 
the Bill of Rights holistically, as a document with certain themes 
whose parts are related to these themes and to one another. Instead, 
tracking the "peculiar logistics" of incorporation, constitutional law 
scholars have tended to approach the Bill of Rights as a string of dis-
crete blocks of text, "with each bit examined in isolation."315 In tak-
ing that approach, they have also neglected the relationship of the Bill 
of Rights to the rest of the Constitution, treating the design for gov-
ernment and the protection of individual rights in most respects as two 
separate domains - the former largely governed by the main body of 
the Constitution, and the latter belonging to the realm of the Bill of 
Rights. 
What is of particular relevance to the problem at hand is that a 
clause-by-clause approach to the Bill of Rights thrusts the individual 
312. Amar, supra note 25. 
313. Id. at 1136. 
314. Id. at 1131, 1201. 
315. Id. at 1136, 1131. 
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rights it contains into the foreground, while obscuring the democratic 
themes that run through the document as a whole. As Amar neatly 
puts it: 
Of course individual and minority rights did constitute a motif of the 
Bill of Rights - but not the sole, or even the dominant, motif. A close 
look at the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with lan-
guage of rights; states' rights and majority rights alongside individual 
and minority rights; and protection of various intermediate associations 
- church, militia, and jury - designed to create an educated and virtu-
ous electorate. The main thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organi-
zational structure, but to deploy it; not to impede popular majorities, but 
to empower them.316 
The tendency of contemporary judges and scholars to overlook the 
fact that the Bill of Rights as a whole contains important democratic 
themes has deprived them of an important aid to the understanding 
and construction of the First Amendment's religion language. Situ-
ating the religion provisions within the context of the Bill of Rights as 
a whole would have brought out the relationships between those provi-
sions and the "structural ideas" Amar mentioned. Such a holistic 
reading lends considerable support to the view Justice Stewart plain-
tively voiced in Sherbert v. Verner 317 nearly thirty years ago that the 
free exercise guarantee was meant to apply to all Americans, majori-
ties as well as minorities. It reinforces the likelihood that the estab-
lishment language was meant to protect the diverse local arrangements 
that the citizens of the several states had made with respect to religion. 
And it makes it reasonable to suppose that "the people" were to be 
protected, not only in their solitary individual religious beliefs and 
practices, but in the associations and institutions where those beliefs 
and practices were generated, regenerated, nurtured, promoted, and 
transmitted. 
A structural approach also suggests that the Bill of Rights is not 
only a catalog of negative individual liberties, but a charter of "posi-
tive protection"318 for certain structures of civil society, notably reli-
gious organizations, community militia, and juries. Far from being 
"neutral" with regard to these structures, Amendments One, Two, 
Six, and Seven single them out for special treatment, and not just in 
disputes decided by judges, for the Bill of Rights is addressed to legis-
lators as well. 
A structural reading of the Bill of Rights reminds us that the 
Founders attached particular importance to the kinds of rights that 
316. Id. at 1132. 
317. 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). 
318. 374 U.S. at 415-16. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
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help to create conditions for the exercise of other rights. When Alex-
ander Hamilton famously described the Constitution as "itself . . . a 
Bill of Rights," he was calling attention to the fact that representative 
institutions, federalism, checks and balances, and the separation of 
powers all work together to help set conditions conducive to the flour-
ishing of democratic self-govemment.319 Similarly, those features of 
the Bill of Rights that accord constitutional status to certain interme-
diate associations - religious groups foremost among them - were 
designed in part to promote self-government by fostering participation 
in public life, protecting the seedbeds of civic virtue, and educating 
citizens about their rights and obligations. The nonestablishment pro-
vision of the First Amendment, for example, served to shelter from 
governmental interference "'the pluralistic structure of the back-
ground social institutions necessary to make [religious] choice both 
possible and meaningful.' " 320 In this, as in other respects, it does not 
stand against, but works in harmony with, the free exercise provision. 
A holistic reading thus suggests that individual free exercise can-
not be treated in isolation from the need of religious associations and 
their members for a protected sphere within which they can provide 
for the definition, development, and transmission of their own beliefs 
and practices. This was Chief Justice Rehnquist's premise in his 1978 
Miami lecture on our "adversarial society."321 Contemporary com-
mentators and courts, however, have tended to concentrate primarily 
on the more narrowly individual aspects of religious liberty, overlook-
ing the fact that, for many individuals, free exercise is inherently asso-
ciational. 322 With rare exceptions, 323 the Supreme Court has been 
relatively insensitive to the ways in which individual free exercise is 
mediated through organizations, and to the needs of these organiza-
tions and their members for a protected space within which each 
group may "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the 
appeal of its dogma."324 Whatever the deficiencies of the Court's 
319. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 510, 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (emphasis omitted). 
320. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1638 (quoting Note, Reinterpreting the Reli· 
gion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 
1475 (1984)). 
321. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text. 
322. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1742, 1770. 
323. Notably, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also supra notes 131-47 
(discussing Yoder). 
324. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
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treatment of individual free exercise over the years, 325 they pale before 
its habitual unwillingness to consider how profoundly the taxing and 
regulatory powers of the state can interfere with free exercise in its 
fullest sense. 326 
It does not seem plausible that the logistics of incorporation alone 
can explain this continuous pattern of oversight. After all, associa-
tional freedoms have been recognized, to some degree, in other consti-
tutional areas.327 The fact is that in the chunk-by-chunk process of 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, some chunks have received more atten-
tion than others. The fate of the Religion Clause at the hands of many 
judges and scholars thus may reflect the legal community's implicit 
hierarchy among rights. To most contemporary lawyers, it seems fair 
to say, the mention of the First Amendment evokes, first and fore-
most, free speech. Indeed, in everyday legal 'parlance, the First 
Amendment is virtually synonymous with speech. This ha~it seems to 
go beyond mere mental and verbal shorthand. When Justice Cardozo 
committed the Court in Palko v. Connecticut to the proposition that 
some rights were more important than others, he mentioned religion 
as being in the preferred category, but his chief examples of important 
rights were freedom of speech and thought.328 Today, Laurence Tribe 
speaks for many in the legal world when he describes the freedom of 
speech as "the Constitution's most majestic guarantee."329 There is 
also a large following, especially in the academy, for Justice Brandeis' 
claim that "the right most valued by civilized men" is "the right to be 
let alone," the right of privacy. 330 Some commentators have conflated 
the freedom of religion with other First Amendment rights as a form 
of expression, or referred to it obliquely as freedom of conscience.331 
The scant space accorded to First Amendment religion issues in con-
stitutional law texts and casebooks provides further evidence of an im-
plicit ranking of constitutional values in which protection of religious 
325. See McConnell, supra note 152; see also Judge Noonan's dissenting opinion in EEOC v. 
Townley Engg. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 622, 625-29 (9th Cir. 1988), cataloging the instances in 
which free exercise claims have been rejected by the federal courts. 
326. See especially Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Texas 
Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 
U.S. 290 (1985). Douglas Laycock has commented that Swaggart culminates the line of cases 
"that savages the rights of churches as social groups or mediating institutions." Douglas Lay-
cock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
327. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371U.S.415, 428-29 (1963) (stating that activities of NAACP 
"are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). 
328. 302 U.S. 319, 324, 327 (1937). 
329. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 785. 
330. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
331. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 (1981). 
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freedom does not enjoy high standing. 332 
Related, probably, to the relatively low priority that religious free-
dom seems to enjoy in the interpretive community of lawyers is a 
widely accepted set of assumptions about religion. The ideas that reli-
gion is "wholly private,"333 "an individual experience,"334 or that a 
religion "worthy of respect" is the product of an individual's 
"choice"335 made it difficult for those who adhered to them to attend 
to the associational, institutional, and ecological dimensions of Reli-
gion Clause cases. 
A constitutional scholar of the critical theory school acknowledged 
in 1986 that "[c]ontemporary constitutional law just does not know 
how to handle problems of religion."336 This unusual awkwardness on 
the part of legal elites with regard to issues of great moment to the 
overwhelming majority of our country's citizens337 seems partially ex-
plainable in relation to the hierarchy of constitutional values and the 
assumptions about religion mentioned above. American church-state 
law also has been deeply affected, however, by a cognitive problem 
that is pervasive in contemporary legal culture. Religion Clause juris-
prudence is a veritable museum of examples of the inability of a con-
ceptual apparatus geared only to the individual, the state, and the 
market to take account of the social dimensions of human personhood, 
and of the social environments that individual human beings require in 
order to fully develop their potential. 338 Lawyers, who are trained to 
operate within the individual-state-market framework, have simply 
tended to take for granted the crisscrossing networks of associations 
and relationships that constitute the warp and woof of civil society. 
Thus, it is not surprising that scholars and judges in the 1950s and 
1960s, in their zeal to increase legal protection for certain preferred 
liberties, gave little thought to the social costs they might be inflicting 
332. See the survey provided by Douglas Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching 
Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1643 n.6 
(1988) (book review). The apparent attitudes of scholars diverge markedly from what opinion 
polls reveal about views in the population generally. Most American men and women still place 
the freedom of speech exactly where the Framers of the Bill of Rights placed it, very close to, but 
just behind, the free exercise of religion. ROBERT 0. WYATT, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC 10 (1991). 
333. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
334. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
335. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (Stevens, J.). 
336. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 702. 
337. In 1991, the broadest and most comprehensive survey of religious attitudes ever under-
taken in the United States showed that over 90% of Americans identify themselves as belonging 
to a religion. Ari S. Goldman, Portrait of Religion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at Al. 
338. See generally GLENDON, supra note 36, at ch. 5. 
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on structures that help to create a culture in which human rights and 
dignity will be respected. 
To pin so many hopes in this regard on the public schools, as some 
of the Justices seem to have done, was not only to overlook the poten-
tial for tyranny in state control of education, but to underestimate seri-
ously the extent to which the public schools themselves depended, and 
still depend, on the support of and interaction with families and sur-
rounding communities. Today, social conditions make it impossible to 
continue ignoring that these social environments - families, work-
place associations, neighborhoods, religious associations - like our 
natural environment, are not in peak condition. It is no longer, and 
indeed never was, just a few small and relatively self-contained com-
munities like the Amish or the Native Americans who are threatened 
by modem society's "hydraulic" pressures toward conformity.339 
Parental concern at the grass-roots level about education has been 
a major factor in interfaith cooperation over the years. The primary 
initiators of challenges to the state's monopoly over education are not 
organized religions, but parents who increasingly sense that they are 
losing the struggle for the hearts and minds of their own children. 
Interfaith cooperation and support for family and student aid, as dis-
tinct from direct aid to schools, belies the notion that experiments 
along these lines would lead to civil strife and chaos. A 1987 Harvard 
Law Review survey of recent developments in church-state law re-
ported that the Court has ceased to evoke political divisiveness as a 
reason for policing the boundaries between religion and public life. 340 
Upholding a state tax exemption for private school parents in Mueller 
v. Allen, the Court remarked, "At this point in the 20th century we are 
quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to in-
clude the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights .... The risk of 
... deep political division along religious lines ... is remote .... " 341 
C. Prospects for a Structural Approach 
Though a long overdue reconsideration of Religion Clause juris-
prudence from the foundations might seem improbable after all these 
years, we believe the current Court's thinking could well lead in that 
direction. Six of the present Justices are on record as dissatisfied with 
Lemon v. Kurtzman's attempt to place mortar in the crumbling wall of 
339. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972) (Burger, C.J.) 
340. See Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1685-86. 
341. 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, 
J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)). 
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separation.342 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree 
provides a sound historical basis for tackling the neglected ques-
tions. 343 Justice White, who joined in that dissent, has pronounced 
himself ready on several occasions for "a basic reconsideration of our 
precedents. "344 
That several members of the Court are already reaching toward a 
holistic approach to the text suggests that such a basic overhaul might 
well proceed along structural lines. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, 
for example, have tended to treat both religion provisions as in the 
service of religious liberty, though they are not in accord with what 
should follow from such a reading. Justice Scalia's opinion for the 
Court in Employment Division v. Smith, moreover, reveals a majority 
ready to take account of the interplay among the various parts of the 
Bill of Rights, specifically, the ways in which one constitutional value 
can be amplified or muted by its association with other constitutional 
values. 345 What Scalia referred to as "hybrid" cases requiring a higher 
level of scrutiny were those in which the plaintiffs' claims seemed espe-
cially strong because they were supported by mutually reinforcing 
constitutional rights. 346 The explicit connection Scalia recognized be-
tween the right of free exercise and the right of association may fore-
shadow a more capacious and less individualistic view of free exercise 
rights than that which has long prevailed on the Court.347 
A structural approach to free exercise problems would not render 
the issues in future cases easy of resolution, but it would provide a 
more principled and adequately complex framework for dealing with 
them than the rigid approaches of the past. It would be markedly 
superior to complete deference, which purchases coherence and clar-
ity, but at the price of a constitutional right. Akhil Amar has pro-
posed another "clean solution," namely to treat the Fourteenth 
Amendment as "incorporating free exercise, but not establishment, 
342. See supra note 258. 
343. See supra notes 31-35, 298-306 and accompanying text. 
344. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). 
345. 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601-02 (1990); see supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text. 
346. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 276 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); 
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
347. Smith, 1 IO S. Ct. at 1602: "[l]t is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on 
freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise concerns." In 
support, Justice Scalia quoted Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1983): "An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to 
petition the government ... could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] 
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 468 
U.S. at 622. 
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principles against state govemments."348 The problem with such a so-
lution, however, is that, like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
that has been proposed in reaction to Smith, 349 it would perpetuate the 
spurious distinction between establishment and free exercise, making 
outcomes depend on a classification that is inherently arbitrary. If a 
coherent and principled approach is desired, there thus seems to be no 
way to avoid coming to grips with basic questions about the meaning 
and purpose of the Religion Clause in the light of text and tradition. 350 
Another range of thorny problems arises from the fact that free 
exercise, like any other right, cannot be unlimited. Institutional, asso-
ciational, and individual free exercise rights, like other rights, will 
sometimes be in tension with each other and with other important 
constitutional values. The major interpretive challenge for the future, 
we believe, will be to accord as much scope as possible to the constitu-
tional guarantee of free exercise in its personal, associational, and in-
stitutional dimensions, while respecting the freedom of conscience of 
nonbelievers and without preferring one religion to another. A virtue 
of a structural approach to that formidable task is that it points to-
ward addressing problems of fairness to all Americans, whatever their 
beliefs, through considering the complex interplay among free exer-
cise, free speech, and equal protection principles, rather than through 
rigid, mechanical separationism. 
Not the least of the advantages of a holistic approach to these most 
delicate of problems is that fairness and tolerance enjoy a legitimacy 
among the population at large that crude separationism has never 
commanded. The Court's precedents contain much that will continue 
to be valuable here, for Court majorities have always vigorously ex-
pounded the importance of evenhanded treatment of all religions, and 
have always been solicitous of the freedom of conscience of 
nonbelievers. 351 
A structural approach to Religion Clause jurisprudence also will 
afford an occasion to provide the attention to mediating structures 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist called for in his Miami lecture. Recog-
nizing the artificiality of the distinction between establishment and 
free exercise, the Court should now be able to use the sophisticated 
understanding of religion and public life it has been developing in es-
348. Amar, supra note 25, at 1159. 
349. The Act is described in Gaffney et al., supra note 203, at 44. 
350. Cf Mansfield, supra note 26. 
351. See Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1693. 
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tablishment cases like Mueller v. Allen 352 and Bowen v. Kendrick 353 in 
addressing the associational and institutional dimensions of those dis-
putes that have been labeled as free exercise cases. Here, the prece-
dents contain rich resources in the form of principles that await 
amplification and broader application. For example, Chief Justice 
Burger in Yoder, and Justice Brennan on several occasions, stressed 
the importance of "creat[ing] ... an atmosphere in which voluntary 
religious exercise may flourish."354 Justice Brennan, especially, wrote 
perceptively about the way in which protecting the autonomy of reli-
gious organizations protects the individual religious freedom of their 
members. 355 It only remains for the current Court to accord such pro-
tection to the members of all religions, large and small. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent Religion Clause cases show a Court majority earnestly 
beginning to struggle with the formidable and long-neglected interpre-
tive difficulties of the Constitution's religion language. These Justices' 
rejection of mechanical separation and their acceptance of structural 
premises hold out the promise of a principled and workable approach 
to protecting the free exercise of religion in a complex, modern, plural-
istic society. Pressures for simplicity and administrative convenience 
nudge the Court, on the one hand, toward mechanical deference and a 
degree of "unincorporation." A renewed respect for the cautious tech-
niques of common law judging, on the other, tends to perpetuate 
separationism through the elaboration of deeply flawed precedents. 
The common law tradition does afford a lawyerly path through the 
difficulties - a structural approach that begins with text, history, and 
tradition, and that can, indeed must, be developed case by case in the 
light of present-day circumstances. Whether the Justices will unite in 
forging an approach along these lines, and whether they will restore 
religion to its rightful place in the first rank of freedoms remains to be 
seen. 
352. 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
353. 487 U.S. 589 (1988); see supra notes 234-48 and accompanying text. 
354. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
355. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 459-60 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342-43 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); see supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text. 
